制造商英文-员工自我评价范文

企业的性质
R.H．科斯
过去，经济理论一直因未能清楚地说明其假设 而备受困扰。在建立一种理论时，经济学
家常常忽略对其赖以成立的基础的考察。然而，这种考察不仅对 于防止因对有关理论赖以成
立的假设缺乏了解而出现的误解和不必要的争论是必不可少的，而且对于经济 学在一系列不
同假设的选择中做出正确的判断也是极为重要的。例如，值得一提的是，“企业”这个词在 经
济学中的使用方式与一般人的使用方式就有所不同。由于经济理论中存在一种从私人企业而
不 是从产业开始分析的倾向性，因此就更有必要不仅对“企业”这个词给出明确的定义，而且
要弄清它与“ 现实世界”中的企业的不同之处棗假如存在的话，就应该搞清楚。罗宾逊夫人曾
说过：“对于经济学中的 一系列假设，需要提出的两个问题是：它们易于处理吗？它们与现
实世界相吻合吗？”尽管正如罗宾逊夫 人所指出的，“较通常的是，一种假设是可处理的，而
另一种则是现实的，”可能还有这样的理论分支， 其中的假设既是可处理的，又是现实的。
下文将表明，一种不仅是现实的（即能与现实世界中的企业含义 相吻合），而且是易于处理
的（即能用马歇尔所发展起来的两种最强有力的经济分析工具来处理），企业 的定义是可以
获得的。这两种分析工具就是边际概念和替代概念，两者合在一起就是边际替代概念，当然 ，
我们的定义必须“与能被准确表达的正规叙述相联系”。
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在探索企业的定 义时，像经济学家通常所做的那样，首先考察经济体制或许是比较合适
的。让我们来考察一下阿瑟·索尔 特爵土对经济体制的描述。“正常的经济体制自行运行。它
的日常运行不在集中控制之下，它不需要中央 的监查。就人类活动和人类需要的整个领域而
言，供给根据需求而调整，生产根据消费而调整，这个过程 是自动的、有弹性的和反应灵敏
的。”一位经济学家认为，经济体制是由价格机制来协调的，而社会是一 个有机体而不是一
个组织。经济体制“自行运行”，这并不意味着没有私人计划。人们都在不同方案之间 进行着
预测和选择。假如要使经济体制有秩序的话，这就是不可或缺的。但这种理论假定资源的流
动方向直接依赖于价格机制。确实，仅仅试图去做已由价格机制做完的事常常被认为是反对
经济计划工 作的一个理由。然而，阿瑟·索尔特爵士的描述却给出了一个有关我们经济体制
的非常不完整的画面。在 企业中，这种描述根本不适用。例如，我们发现在经济理论中生产
要素在各种不同的用途之间的配置是由 价格机制决定的。如果要素 A的价格在X比在Y高，
则A就会从Y流向X，直到X和Y之间的价格差消 失为止，除非存在着某种程度上的其他
方面的利益补偿。然而，在现实世界中，我们发现这种说法在许多 地方并不适用。如果一个
工人从部门Y流向部门X，他这样做并不是因为相对价格的变化，而是因为他被 命令这样做。
那些反对经济计划工作的人的理由是，问题已被价格机制解决了。对于这种观点，应该指出 ，
我们的经济体制中存在的计划完全不同于上面所提到的私人计划，而类似于通常所说的经济
计 划。上面这个例子在我们的现代经济体制中具有大范围的典型意义。当然，经济学家们并
没有忽视这一事 实。马歇尔把组织作为第四种生产要素引入经济学理论；J.B.克拉克赋予企
业家以统筹职能；奈特教 授强调了经理的协调作用。正如D.H.罗伯逊所指出的，我们发现
了“在不自觉的统筹协调的大海中的 自觉力量的小岛，它如同凝结在一桶黄油牛奶中的一块
块黄油。”但既然人们通常认为统筹协调能通过价 格机制来实现，那么，为什么这样的组织
是必需的呢？为什么会存在“自觉力量的小岛”呢？在企业之外 ，价格变动决定生产，这是通
过一系列市场交易来协调的。在企业之内，市场交易被取消，伴随着交易的 复杂的市场结构
被企业家所替代，企业家指挥生产。显然，存在着协调生产的替代方法。然而，假如生产 是

由价格机制调节的，生产就能在根本不存在任何组织的情况下进行，面对这一事实，我 们要
问：组织为什么存在？
当然，价格机制能被替代的程度有很大差异。在一个百货商店 中，各种柜台在大棱里的
空间配置既可以由管理当局决定，也可以是为场地进行竞争性价格招标的结果。 在兰开夏的
棉纺织业中，一个纺织商能靠信用租到动力设备和店铺，获得织机和棉纱。然而，这一系列< br>生产要素的组织协调通常是在没有价格机制参与的情况下进行的。显然，作为替代价格机制
的“纵 向”一体化的程度在不同产业和不同企业间差别悬殊。
我认为，可以假定企业的显著特征就是作 为价格机制的替代物。当然，正如罗宾斯教
授所指出的：“（企业）与外部的相对价格和相对成本的网络 有关，”可重要的是发现这种关
系的真正性质。莫里斯·多布先生生动地描述了资源配置在企业中和在经 济体系中的区别。
他在讨论亚当·斯密的资本家概念时写道：“人们开始看到存在着比承包商主持的每一 个工厂
或单位的内部关系更加重要的事情；承包商与在他的直接活动空间之外的经济世界存在着联
系……承包商亲自忙于每一个企业内部的劳动分工，并且他自觉地进行着计划和组织，”但是
“他是与 更大规模的经济专业化相联系的，在那里他自己不过是一个专业化的单位。可见，
他在一个大规模的有机 体中发挥着他作为一个单个细胞的作用，他几乎是不自觉地担任着一
个重要角色。
就事 实而言，虽然经济学家们将价格机制作为一种协调工具，可他们也承认了“企业家”
的协调功能，研究为 什么协调在某一情况下是价格机制的工作，而在另一种情况下又是企业
家的工作是极为重要的。本文的目 的就是要在经济理论的一个鸿沟上架起一座桥梁，这个鸿
沟出现在这样两个假设之间：一个假设（为了某 些目的作出的）是，资源的配置由价格机制
决定；另一个假设（为了其他一些目的作出的）是，资源的配 置依赖于作为协调者的企业家。
我们必须说明在实践中影响在这两者之间进行选择的基础。
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我们的任务是试图发现企业在一个专业化的交换经济中出现的根本原因。价格机制（单
纯从 资源导向的方面考虑）可以被替代，假如替代价格机制的关系正是其自身所期望的话。
例如，如果 一些人愿意在其他一些人的指挥下工作，这一情形就会出现。这些个人为了
能在某个人手下工作会接受低 报酬，企业便由此自然而然地出现了，但这不能成为企业出现
的一个非常重要的现由，似乎更确切他说， 还有一种相对立的倾向在起作用，如人们通常趋
向于寻求“成为自己的主人”的好处自然，如果这种愿望 不是被人控制，而是控制别人和指挥
别人，那么，人们为了能指挥别人可能会愿意放弃某些东西，那就是 ，他们将愿意支付给别
人多于这些人在价格机制下所能得到的报酬，目的是为了能指挥这些人。但这意味 着他们是
为了能指挥别人而付钱，而不是以指挥别人而赚钱，在大多数情形下这显然是不真实的。如果购买者较之于以其他方式生产的商品更偏爱由企业生产的商品，企业也可能存在；可是，
即使在这 种偏好（假如它们存在的话）的重要性可以忽略不计的范畴内，在现实世界中企业
仍然存在。因此，必定 存在其他相关的因素。
建立企业有利可图的主要原因似乎是，利用价格机制是有成本的。通过价格 机制“组织”
生产的最明显的成本就是所有发现相对价格的工和。随着出卖这类信息的专门人员的出现，
这种成本有可能减少，但不可能消除。市场上发生的每一笔交易的谈判和签约的费用也必须
考虑 在内。再者，在某些市场中（如农产品交易）可以设计出一种技术使契约的成本最小化，
但不可能消除这 种成本。确实，当存在企业时，契约不会被取消，但却大大减少了。某一生

产要素（或它 的所有者）不必与企业内部同他合作的一些生产要素签订一系列的契约。当然，
如果这种合作是价格机制 起作用的一个直接结果，一系列的契约就是必需的。一系列的契约
被一个契约替代了。在此阶段，重要的 是注意契约的特性，即注意企业中被雇佣的生产要素
是如何进入的。通过契约，生产要素为获得一定的报 酬（它可以是固定的也可以是浮动的）
同意在一定限度内服从企业家的指挥。契约的本质在于它限定了企 业家的权力范围。只有在
限定的范围内，他才能指挥其他生产要素。
然而，利用价格机制 也存在着其他方面的不利因素（或成本）。为某种物品或劳务的供
给签订长期的契约可能是期望的。这可 能缘于这样的事实：如果签订一个较长期的契约以替
代若干个较短期的契约，那么，签订每一个契约的部 分费用就将被节省下来。或者，由于人
们注重避免风险，他们可能宁愿签订长期契约而不是短期契约。现 在的问题是，由于预测方
面的困难，有关物品或劳务供给的契约期越长，实现的可能性就越小，从而买方 也越不愿意
明确规定出要求缔约对方干些什么。对于供给者来说，通过几种方式中的哪一种来进行物品< br>或劳务的供给，井没有多大差异，可对于物品或劳务的购买者来说就不是如此。但由于购买
者不知 道供给者的几种方式中哪一种是他所需要的，因此，将来要提供的劳务只是以一般条
款规定一下，而具体 细节则留待以后解决。契约中的所有陈述是要求供给者供给物品或劳务
的范围，而要求供给者所做的细节 在契约中没有阐述，是以后由购买者决定的。当资源的流
向（在契约规定的范围内）变得以这种方式依赖 于买方时，我称之为“企业” 的那种关系就
流行起来了。因此，企业或许就是在期限很短的契约不令人 满意的情形下出现的。购买劳务
棗劳动棗的情形显然比购买物品的情形具有更为重要的意义。在购买物品 时，主要项目能够
预先说明而其中细节则以后再决定的意义并不大。我们可以将这一节的讨论总结一下。 市场
的运行是有成本的，通过形成一个组织，并允许某个权威（一个“企业家”）来支配资源，就
能节约某些市场运行成本。企业家不得不在低成本状态下行使他的职能，这是鉴于如下的事
实：他可以 以低于他所替代的市场交易的价格得到生产要素，因为如果他做不到这一点，通
常也能够再回到公开市场 。不确定性问题常常被认为是与对企业均衡的研究密切相关的。如
果没有不确定性，企业的出现似乎是不 可思议的。但是，那些认为支付方式是企业的特征的
人（如奈特教授）棗一个接受剩余的和浮动的收入的 人保证那些参加生产的人有固定的收入
棗似乎提出一个与我们所考虑的问题无关的观点。一个企业家可以 将他的劳务出售给另一个
企业家以获得一定的货币收入，而他支付给雇员的钱则主要或完全是其利润的一 部分。重要
的问题看来是，资源的配置为什么没有直接通过价格机制来完成。
另一个应该 注意的因素是，有管制力量的政府或其他机构常常对市场交易和在企业内部
组织同样的交易区别对待。如 果我们考察一下销售税的课征就会看到，显然，它是一种有关
市场交易而不是在企业内部组织的同样交易 的税收。既然现在有两种不同的可供选择的“组
织”方法棗通过价格机制或通过企业家，那么这样的政府 管制便会导致企业的存在，不然企
业的存在就没有任何理由和目的。这为在一个专业化的交换经济中企业 的出现提供了一个理
由。当然，对于企业已经存在的情形而言，诸如销售税这样的措施只不过会使企业变 得比原
来更大。同样，意味着定量配给的配额和价格控制的办法对于那些为自己生产产品的企业是
没有作用的，这等于给那些在企业内部组织生产而不通过市场的企业以好处，必然鼓励企业
规模的扩大 。但是，上述这些作为监督、管理的措施会导致企业的出现，这一点是令人难以
置信的。然而，如果企业 的存在没有其他理由，那么这些措施会产生这样的结果。
因此，以上这些就是在一个通常被假定由 价格机制“组织”资源分配的专业化交换经济
中，诸如企业这类组织存在的原因。所以，当资源的导向依 赖于企业家时，由一些关系系统
构成的企业就开始出现了。

这种初具轮廓 的观念看来会有助于对企业规模扩大或缩小的含义作出科学的解释。当追
加的交易（它可以是通过价格机 制协调的交易）由企业家来组织时，企业就变大；当企业家
放弃对这些交易的组织时，企业就变小。由此 产生的问题是，研究决定企业规模的力量是否
有可能。为什么企业家不少组织点或多组织点交易呢？注意 一下奈特教授的观点是有意义
的：
“效率与规模之间的关系是最严肃的理论问题之一，从 本质上讲，就一个工厂的效率与
规模之间的关系而言，其在相当程度上与其说是取决于智力的一般原理， 不如说是取决于个
人人格和历史机遇。但这个问题是至关重要的，因为垄断收益的可能性对企业不断的和 无限
的扩张提供了强有力的激励，而这种力量必然被随着企业规模的增大而使效率下降（在货币
收入的生产中）的一些同样强有力的力量所抵销，所有这些即使在有限竞争时也存在。”
奈特教授 似乎认为科学地分析企业规模的决定是不可能的。现在，我们将在上述企业概
念的基础上，试图完成这个 任务。
前已论及，企业的引入基本上是由于市场运行成本的存在。一个与此相关问题是（远非奈特教授所提出的垄断问题），既然通过组织能消除一定的成本，而且事实上减少了生产成
本，那么 为什么市场交易仍然存在呢？为什么所在生产不由一个大企业去进行呢？对这一向
题，看来确有某种可能 的解释。
首先，当企业扩大时，对企业家的功能来说，收益可能会减少，也就是说，在企业内部< br>组织追加交易的成本可能会上升。自然，企业的扩大必须达到这一点，即在企业内部组织一
笔额外 交易的成本等于在公开市场上完成这笔交易所需的成本，或者等于由另一个企业家来
组织这笔交易的成本 。其次，当组织的交易增加时，或许企业家不能成功地将生产要素用在
它们价值最大的地方，也就是说， 不能导致生产要素的最佳使用。再者，交易增加必须达到
这一点，即资源浪费带来的亏损等于在公开市场 上进行交易的成本，或者等于由另一个企业
家组织这笔交易的亏损。最后，一种或多种生产要素的供给价 格可能会上升，因为小企业的
“其他优势”大于大企业。当然，企业扩张的实际停止点可能由上述各因素 共同决定。前两个
原因最有可能对应于经济学家们的“管理收益递减“的论点。
上文已经 指出这样一点：企业将倾向于扩张直到在企业内部组织一笔额外交易的成本，
等于通过在公开市场上完成 同一笔交易的成本或在另一个企业中组织同样交易的成本为止。
但如果企业在低于公开市场上的交易成本 这一点上或在等于在另一个企业中组织同样交易
的成本这一点上停止其扩张，在大多数情况下（“联合” 的情况除外），这将意味着在这两
个生产者之间存在着市场交易，其中每一方都能在低于实际市场运行成 本的水平上组织生
产。如何解决这个悖论呢？为了便于说明，我们来举一个例子。假定A向B购买产品， 且A
和B都能在低于其现在成本的条件下组织市场交易。我们可以假定，B不是组织生产的一个
过程或阶段，而是组织许多个。假如A由此希望避免市场交易，那他将不得不接管所有由B
控制的生产过 程。除非A接管了所有生产过程，否则市场交易将依然存在，尽管市场上交
易的是不同的产品。但我们前 面已经假定，每一个生产者的扩张会导致效率降低；组织一笔
额外交易的附加成本会上升。A组织先前由 B组织的交易的成本可能会大于B 做这件事的
成本。只有当A组织B的工作的成本不大于B的成本且数 量上等于公开市场上完成同样交
易的成本时，A才会由此接管B的所有组织。可一旦市场交易变得经济时 ，以这样的方式将
生产分开也要付出代价，即在每一个企业中组织一笔额外交易的成本是一样的。
直到现在我们一直假定通过价格机制发生的市场交易是同质的。事实上，没有一件事能
够比 我们现代社会中发生的实际交易更多样化了。这似乎意味着通过价格机制完成交易的成

本 是彼此差异很大的，而在企业内部组织交易的成本亦如此。因此，即使撇开收益递减问题，
在企业内部组 织某些交易的成本似乎也有可能大于在公开市场上完成交易的成本。这必然意
味着通过价格机制完成的交 易是存在的，但这意味着必须存在一个以上的企业吗？显然不
是，因为在经济体制中，凡是资源导向不直 接依赖于价格机制的所有领域，都能被组织到一
个企业中去。本文早先讨论的因素看来很重要，尽管难以 断言“管理收益递减”或要素供给价
格上升是否看起来更为重要。
所以，当其他条件相同时，企业在如下情况下将趋于扩大：
1. 组织成本愈少，随着被组织的交易的增多，成本上升得愈慢。
2. 企业家犯错误的可能性愈小，随着被组织的交易的增多，失误增加得愈少。
3. 企业规模愈大，生产要素的供给价格下降得愈大（或上升得愈小）。
对不同规模的企业而言，除了 生产要素的供给价格千差万别外，随着被组织的交易的空
间分布、交易的差异性和相对价格变化的可能性 的增加，组织成本和失误带来的亏损似乎也
会增加。当更多的交易由一个企业家来组织时，交易似乎将倾 向于既有不同的种类也有不同
的位置。这为企业扩大时效率将趋于下降提供了一个附加原因。倾向于使生 产要素结合得更
紧和分布空间更小的创新，将导致企业规模的扩大。倾向于降低空间组织成本的电话和电 报
的技术变革将导致企业规模的扩大。一切有助于提高管理技术的变革都将导致企业规模的扩
大 。
应该注意到，上面给出的企业的定义能被用于对“联合”和“一体化”作出精确的解释。当先前由两个或更多个企业家组织的交易变成由一个企业家组织时，便出现了联合。当所涉
及的先前 由企业家之间在市场上完成的交易被组织起来时，这便是一体化。企业能以这两种
方式中的一种或同时以 这两种方式进行扩张。整个 “竞争性产业的结构”便能用通常的经济
分析方法来处理了。
3
前一节中所考察的问题井没有被经济学家们所完全忽视。现在需要考虑的是，为什么上
述关 于企业在专业化交换经济中出现的原因比其他已有的解释更可取。有人说，企业存在的
原因可以从劳动分 工中发现。这是厄舍教授的观点，这一观点已被莫里斯·多布先生接受和
扩展。企业是“劳动分工日益复 杂的结果……经济分工程度的增长需要一定的一体化力量，没
有一体化力量，分工将导致混乱；而且正是 因为在分工经济中存在一体化力量，产业形式才
富有意义。”这一答案的结论是明显的。“分工经济中的 一体化力量”已经以价格机制的形式
存在了。经济科学的主要功绩或许是它已表明没有理由认为专业化必 然导致混乱。莫里斯，
多布先生给出的原因因此是站不佳脚的。必须说明的是，为什么一种一体化力量（ 企业家）
会替代另一种一体化力量（价格机制）。在奈特教授的《风险、不确定性和利润》一书中可以找到已有的说明这一事实的最有意思的（也可能是最广为接受的）理由。他的观点将详细
说明如下 。奈特教授从不存在不确定性的体制开始说明：
“个体在绝对自由而没有合谋人的情形下的行动， 应该是通过劳动的一级和二级分工及
资本的使用等来组织经济生活，这在今天的美国已发展到广为人知的 程度。能唤起人们想象
力的基本事实是生产团体和行政机构的内部组织。当不确定性完全不存在时，每个 个人都能
够掌握有关势态的全部知识，任何责任管理的性质和对生产活动的控制就都没有必要了。甚

至任何现实意义上的市场交易也将不复存在。未经加工的原材料和生产服务流向消费者将完< br>全是自动的。”
奈特教授说，我们可以想象这种协调是“单靠试错法发挥作用的长期实践过 程的结果，”
没有必要“去想象每个工人处于与他人的工作有关的„事先建立起的和谐‟ 气氛中在恰当 的时
间里准确无误地做着恰当的工作。那里或许有旨在协调个人活动的管理者和监督者等”这些
管理者仅承担单纯的日常职能，“没有任何性质的责任。”
奈特教授接着说：“把不确定性棗无 知的事实和只靠判断而不靠知识进行行动的必要性
棗导入伊甸园式的情形中，其特征会完全改观……伴随 着不确定性的存在而行事，行动的实
际执行在现实意义上变成生活的次要部分了，而首要的问题和职能是 决定做什么和怎样去
做。”
不确定性的事实带来了有关社会组织的两个最重要的特征。
“第一，物品是为市场而生产的，其基础是完全非个人的需求预测，而不是为满足生产
者 自己的需要。生产者承担了预测消费者需求的责任。第二，预测工作和与此同时的对生产
的技术指导和控 制的大部分会进一步集中在一小部分生产者那里，由此出现了新的经济工作
人员棗企业家。……当存在不 确定性时，决定做什么和怎么做的任务相对于其实施处于支配
地位，生产团体的内部组织不再是无关紧要 的事情和机械性的细节。决策和控制功能的集中
化是亟需的，一个„头领化‟的过程不可避免。”
最根本的变化是：
“在这种体制下，自信者和冒险家承担风险或保证动摇者和胆小鬼 获得一定的收入，以
此作为对实际结果进行分配的交换……出于人类的天性，我们知道，一个人保证另一 个人行
动的特定结果而没有赋予其支配他人工作的权力是不现实的和非常罕见的。另一方面，没有
这样的保证，后者不会将自己置于前者的指挥之下……功能的多层次专业化的结果是企业和
产业的工资 制度，它在世界上的存在是不确定性这一事实的直接结果。”
这些引语表明了奈特教授的理论的实 质。不确定性的存在意味着人们不得不预测未来的
需要。因此出现了一个特殊阶层，他们向他人支付有保 证的工资，并以此控制他人的行动。
因为良好的判断力通常与一个人对其判断力的自信心相联系，所以这 个特殊阶层起着作用。
奈特教授似乎给自己留下了几个需要商榷的题目。首先，正如他自己指出的 ，某些人具
有较好的判断力和知识这一事实并不意味着他们只能从亲自参加生产中获得收入。他们可以< br>出卖建议和知识。每－个企业都买下了一大帮顾问的劳务。我们可以想象－个所有的建议和
知识都 是按需购买的体制。其次，通过与正在进行生产的人缔结契约而不是主动地参加生产
也能以较好的知识和 判断力获得报酬。商人购买期货即为一例。但这只不过说明，给予完成
的某些行为以报酬保证而没有去指 挥这些行为的完成，是完全可能的。奈特教授说“基于人
类的天性，我们知道，一个人保证另一个人行动 的特定结果而没有赋予其支配他人工作的权
力是不现实的和非常罕见的，”这显然是不正确的。大部分工 作是根据契约去做的，就是说，
契约保证给缔约人的某些行为以一定的收益。但这并没包含任何支配。然 而，这确实意味着
相对价格制度发生了变化，并将出现生产要紊的重新安排。奈特教授提到的“没有这样 的保
证，后者不会将自己置于前者的指挥之下”这一事实与我们正在考察的问题无关。最后，值
得注意的是，奈特教授认为“即使在不存在不确定性的经济体制中，仍存在协调者，尽管他

们仅承担日常工作的职能。奈特教授迅速补充说他们将“没有任何性质的责任”，于是问题出
现了：谁 给他们报酬？，为什么？奈特教授似乎从末说明价格机制被替代的原因。
4
进一步说明 这一点看来是重要的，那就是上述讨论与“企比成本曲线”的一般问题的相关
性。人们有时假定，如果企 业的成本曲线向上倾斜，在完全竞争条件下，企业在规模上会受
到限制；而在不完全竞争条件下，企业在 规模上受到限制是因为当边际成本等于边际收益时，
企业不愿意付出大于产出的生产代价。但显然企业可 以生产一种以上的产品，所以，没有显
而易见的原因说明为什么在完全竞争的情况下成本曲线向上倾斜和 在不完全竞争的情况下，
边际成本通常不低于边际收益的事实会限制企业的规模。罗宾逊夫人作出了仅生 产一种产品
的简单假定，但研究企业生产的产品种数是如何决定的，显然是重要的，同时，没有一种假< br>定实际上只生产一种产品的理论会有非常大的实际意义。
有人或许会说，在完全竞争条件下 ，既然生产的每一种产品都能按照通行的价格出售，
那么就没必要生产任何其他产品了。但这一说法忽视 了这样的事实，那就是可能存在这一情
况：组织一种新产品的交易较之继续组织老产品的交易成本要低。 这一点可以用下面的方法
加以说明。根据冯·屠能的思路，设想有一个小镇，是消费中心，还有一些产业 分布在这个
中心的周围。这些情况可用下图说明，其中A，B，C表示不同的产业。设想一个企业家从X
开始控制交易。现在，当他在同一种产品（B）上扩大其生产经营活动时，组织成本会增加，
直 到它等于邻近的其他产品的组织成本为止。随着企业的扩张，企业生产由此将从一种产品
发展到多种产品 （A和C）。这样处理问题显然是不全面的，但对于表明仅仅论证成本曲线
倾向于向上不能得出企业规模 会受到限制的结论，则是必要的。至此，我们只考察了完全竞
争的情况，而不完全竞争的情况似乎是显而 易见的。
为了确定企业的规模，我们不得不考虑市场成本（即使用价格机制的成本）和不同企业< br>家的组织成本，而后我们才能确定每一个企业生产多少种产品和每一种产品生产多少。因此，
肖夫 先生在他的关于“不完全竞争”的论义中显然提出了罗宾逊夫人的成本曲线理论所不能
回答的问题。上面 提到的因素似乎是与此相关的。
5
现在唯一剩下的问题是，看一看已经发展起来的企业 概念是不是与现实世界中的情况相
一致。通过考虑通常被称为“主人与仆人”或“雇主与雇员”的法律关 系，我们能很好地研究现
实中企业的构成问题。这种关系的实质列举如下：
“（1）仆人 必须向主人或主人的其他代理人承担提供个人劳务的义务，而契约就是有关
物品或类似物品的出售的契约 。
（2）主人必须有权亲自或者通过另一个仆人或代理人控制仆人的工作。有权告诉仆人
何时工作（在服务时间内）和何时不工作，以及做什么工作和如何去做（在服务范围内），
这种控制和干 预的权利就是这种关系的本质特征，它从独立的缔约人或从仅向其雇主提供其
劳动成果的雇员中区分出了 仆人。在后一种情形中，缔约人或执行人不是在雇主的控制下做
工作和提供劳务，而是他必须计划和设法 完成他的工作，以便实现他答应提供的结果。”
由此可见，指挥是“雇主与雇员”这种法律关系的 实质，这正是上文所提出的经济概念。
巴特教授的话是值得注意的

“代理 人与仆人的区别并不是存在或不存在固定工资或由企业专门委员会决定的报酬，
而是代理人有就业的自由 。”
由此我们可以得出结论，我们给出的定义与现实世界中的企业是非常接近的。因此，我
们的定义是现实的。那么，我们的定义能应用吗？答案显然是肯定的。当我们考虑企业应多
大时，边际 原理就会顺利地发挥作用。这个问题始终是，在组织权威下增加额外交易要付出
代价吗？在边际点上，在 企业内部组织交易的成本或是等于在另一个企业中的组织成本，或
是等于由价格机制“组织”这笔交易所 包含的成本。实业家们不断地进行实验，多控制一点或
少控制一点交易，用这个办法来维持均衡。这就为 静态分析提供了均衡状态。但显然，动态
因素也是相当重要的。一般只有对引起企业内部组织成本和市场 成本的变化作了调查，才能
说明企业规模为什么扩大或缩小。我们因此有了滚动均衡理论。上面的分析也 似乎澄清了经
营和管理之间的关系。经营意味着预测和通过签订新的契约、利用价格机制进行操作。管理
则恰恰意味着仅仅对价格变化作出反应，并在其控制下重新安排生产要素。实业家们通常具
有这 两种功能是上面所讨论的市场成本的明显结果。最后，这样的分析就使我们更准确地叙
述企业家的“边际 产品”的含义。但对这一点的详细描述会使我们远远超出相形之下较为简单
的定义和分类的任务。

英文校对版：
The nature of the firm
By R. H. Coase
Economic theory has suffered in the past from a failure to state clearly its assumpti
ons . Economists in building up a theory have often omitted to examine the founda
tion on which it was erected. This examination is, however, essential not only to pr
event the misunderstanding and needless controversy which arise from a lack of kn
owledge of the assumptions on which a theory is based, but also because of the e
xtreme importance for economics of good judgment in choosing between rival sets
of assumptions.
For instance, it is suggested that the use of the word in economics may be
different from the use of the term by the man”. Since there is apparently a t
rend in economic theory towards starting analysis with the individual firm and not
with the industry , it is all the more necessary not only that a clear definition of th
e word should be given but that its difference from a firm in the real worl
d,if it exist，should be made clear. Mrs. Robinson has said that two questions
to be asked of a set of assumptions in economics are: Are they tractable? And: D
o they correspond with the real world? “. Though, as Mrs. Robinson points out, “m
ore often one set will be manageable and the other realistic”， yet there may well
be branches of theory where assumptions may he both manageable and realistic.
It is hoped to show in the following paper that a definition of a firm may be obtai
ned which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in
the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economi
c analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution, t
ogether giving the idea of substitution at the margin . Our definition must, of cours
e, to formal relations which are capable of being conceived exactly.
Ⅰ
It is convenient if, in searching for a definition of a firm, we first consider the econ
omic system as it is normally treated by the economists. Let us consider the descri
ption of the economic system given by Sir Arthur Salter. normal economic syst
em works itself. For its current operation it is under no central control, it needs no
central survey. Over the whole range of human activity and human need, supply is
adjusted to demand, and production to consumption, by a process that is automati
c, elastic and economist thinks of the economic system as being co
ordinated by the price mechanism and society becomes not an organization but an
organism. The economic system does not mean that there is no
planning by individuals. These exercise foresight and choose between alternatives.
This is necessarily so if there is to be order in the system. But this theory assumes
that the direction of resources is dependent directly on the price mechanism.

Indeed, it is often considered to be an objection to economic planning that it merel
y tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism. Sir Arthur Salter's descr
iption, however, gives a very incomplete picture of our economic system . Within a
firm， the description does not fit at all.
For instance, in economic theory we find that the allocation of factors of production
between different Uses is determined by the price mechanism. The price of factor
A becomes higher in X than in Y. As a result，A moves from Y to X until the differ
ence between the prices in X and Y , except in so far as it compensates for other
differential advantages, disappears. Yet in the real world , we find that there are m
any areas where this does not apply. If a workman moves from department Y to d
epartment X , he does not go because of a change In relative prices，but because
he is ordered to do so. Those who object to economic planning on the grounds tha
t the problem is solved by price movements can be answered by pointing out that
there is planning within our economic system which is quite different from the indivi
dual planning mentioned above and which is akin to what is normally called econo
mic planning.
The example given above is typical of a large sphere in our modern economic Syst
em. Of course, this fact has not been ignored by llintroduce orga
nization as a fourth factor of production; J B. Clark give the co-ordinating function t
o the entrepreneur; Professor Knight introduces managers who co-ordinate. As. D. H.
Robertson points out, we find islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconsci
ous co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of butter in vi
ew of the fact that it is usually argued that co-ordination will be done by the price
mechanism，why is such organization necessary ? Why are there the of co
nscious power
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-ordinated through
a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a firm, the market transacti
ons are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange
transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator ，who directs production. It
is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordination production. Yet, having r
egard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production co
uld be carried on without any organization at all, well might we ask, why is there a
ny organization?
Of course, the degree to which the price mechanism is superseded varies greatly. I
n a department store, the allocation of the different sections to the various location
s in the building may be done by the controlling authority or it may be the result
of competitive price bidding for space. In theLancashirecotton industry, a weaver ca
n rent power and shop-room and can obtain looms and yarn on credit. This co-ordi
nation of the various factors of production is, however，normally carried out without
the intervention of the price mechanism. As is evident， the amount of int
egration, involving as it does the supersession of the price mechanism, varies greatl
y from industry to industry and from firm to firm.

It can, I think, be assumed that the distinguishing mark of the firm is the superses
sion of the price mechanism. It is of course, as Professor Robbins points out,
ed to an outside network of relative price and costs,but it is important to discover
the exact nature of this relationship. T his distinction between the allocation of res
ources in a firm and the allocation in the economic system has been very vividly de
scribed by Mr. Maurice Dobb when discussing Adam Smith's conception of the capit
alist:it began to be seen that there was something more important than the relati
ons inside each factory or unit captained by an undertaker; there were the relations
of the undertaker with the rest of the economic world outside his immediate spher
e . . . . The undertaker busies himself with the division of labor inside each firm a
nd he plans and organizes consciously,but is related to the much larger econ
omic specialization, of which he himself is merely one specialized unit. Here, he pla
ys his part as a single cell in a larger organism, mainly unconscious of the wider ro
le he fills.
In view of the fact that while economists treat the price mechanism as a co-ordinat
ing instrument, they also admit the co-coordinating function of the it
is surely important to enquire why co- ordination is the work of the price mechanis
m in one case and of the entrepreneur in another. The purpose of this paper is to
bridge what appears to be a gap in economic theory between the assumption (ma
de for some purposes) that resources are allocated by means of the price mechanis
m and the assumption (made for other purposes) that this allocation is dependent
on the entrepreneur-co-ordinator. We have to explain the basis on which in practice,
this choice between alternatives is effected.
Ⅱ
Our task is to attempt to discover why a firm emerges at all in a specialized excha
nge economy. The price mechanism (considered purely from the side of the directio
n of resource) might be superseded if the relationship which replaced it was desired
for its own sake. This would be the case, for example, if some people preferred t
o work under the direction of some other person. Such individuals would accept les
s in order to work under someone, and firms would arise naturally from this. But it
would appear that this cannot be a very important reason , for it would rather se
em that the opposite tendency is operating if one judges from the stress normally l
aid on the advantage of one's own course, if the desire was not
to be controlled but to control, to exercise power over others, then people might
be willing to give up something in order to direct others; that is，they would be wil
ling to pay others more than they could get under the price mechanism in order to
be able to direct them. But this implies that those who direct pay in order to be
able to do this and are not paid to direct, which is clearly not true in the majority
of cases. Firms might also exist if purchasers commodities which are pro
duced by firms to those not so produced; but even in spheres where one would ex
pect such preferences (if they exist) to be of negligible importance, firms are to be
found in the real world. Therefore t here must be other elements involved.

The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that ther
e is a cost of using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of pr
oduction through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant price
s are. This cost may be reduced but it will not be eliminated by the emergence of
specialists who will sell this information. The costs of negotiating and concluding a s
eparate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market must
also be taken into account. Again, in certain markets， e. g.，produce exchanges,
a technique is devised for minimizing these contract costs; but they are not eliminat
ed. It is true that contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but they are gr
eatly reduced. A factor of production (or the owner thereof) does not have to make
a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating within the firm,
as would be necessary， of course, if this co-operation were as a direct result of t
he working of the price mechanism. For this series of contracts is substituted one.
At this stage ， it is important to note the character of the contract into which a fa
ctor enters that is employed within a firm. The contract is one whereby the factor,
for a certain remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the
directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits. The essence of the contract is th
at it should only state the limits to the powers of the entrepreneur. Within these li
mits, he can therefore direct the other factors of production. There are, however, o
ther disadvantages --or costs--of using the price mechanism. It may be desired to
make a long-term contract for the supply of some article or service. This may be d
ue to the fact that if one contract is made for a longer period, instead of several s
horter ones, then certain costs of making each contract will be avoided. Or, owing t
o the risk attitude of the people concerned, they may prefer to make a long rather
than a short- term contract. Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting，the longer t
he period of the contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the less po
ssible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing to specify what
the other contracting party is expected to do. It may well be a matter of indiffere
nce to the person supplying the service or commodity which of several courses of a
ction is taken, but not to the purchaser of that service or commodity. But the purc
haser will not know which of these several courses he will want the supplier to tak
e Therefore, the service which is being provided is expressed in general terms, the
exact details being left until a later date. All that is stated in the contract is the lim
its to what the person supplying the commodity or service is expected to do. The d
etails of what the supplier is expected to do is not stated in the contract but is de
cided later by the purchaser. When the direction of resource (within the limits of th
e contract) becomes dependent on the buyer in this way, that relationship which I
term a may be obtained. A firm is likely therefore to emerge in those cases
where a very short term contract would be unsatisfactory. It is obviously of more i
mportance in the case of services labor than it is in the case of the buying of com
modities. In the case of commodities, the main items can be stated in advance and
the details which will be decided later will be of minor significance.
We may sum up this section of the argument by saying that the operation of a ma
rket costs something and by forming an organization and allowing some authority (a

n entrepreneur to direct the resources， certain marketing costs are saved. The
entrepreneur has to carry out his function at less cost , taking into account the fa
ct that he may get factors of production at a lower price than the market transacti
ons which he supersedes，because it is always possible to revert to the open marke
t if he fails to do this.
The question of uncertainty is one which is often considered to be very relevant to
the study of the equilibrium of the firm. It seems improbable that a firm would em
erge without the existence of uncertainty. But those, for instance, Professor Knight,
who make the mode of payment the distinguishing mark of the firm- fixed incomes
being guaranteed to some of those engaged in production by a person who takes t
he residual，and fluctuating, income would appear to be introducing a point which i
s irrelevant to the problem we are considering. One entrepreneur may sell his servi
ces to another for a certain sum of money, while the payment to his employees m
ay be mainly or wholly a share in profits. The significant question would appear to
be, why, the allocation of resources is not done directly by the price mechanism.
Another factor that should be noted is that exchange transactions on a market and
the same transaction organized within a firm are often treated differently by Govern
ments or other bodies with regulatory powers. If we consider the operation of a sal
es tax, it is clear that it is a tax on market transactions and not on the same trans
actions organized within the firm. Now since these are alternative methods of
nization” by the price mechanism or by the entrepreneur--such a regulation would b
ring into existence firms which otherwise would have no raison d'être. It would furn
ish a reason for the emergence of a firm in a specialized exchange economy. Of co
urse, to the extent that firms already exist， such a measure as a sales tax would
merely tend to make them larger than they would otherwise be，Similarly, quota sc
hemes, and methods of price control which imply that there is rationing, and which
do not apply to firms producing such products for themselves, by allowing advanta
ges to those who organize within the firm and not through the market, necessarily
encourage the growth of firms. But it is difficult to believe that it is measures such
as have been mentioned in this paragraph which have brought firms into existence.
Such measures would， however，tend to have this result if they did not exist for
other reasons.
These, then, are the reasons why organizations such as firms exist in a specialized
exchange economy in which it is generally assumed that the distribution of resource
s is “organized” by the price mechanism. A firm, therefore, consists of the system o
f relationships which come into existence when the direction of resources is depend
ent on an entrepreneur.
The approach which has just been sketched would appear to offer an advantage in
that it is possible to give a scientific meaning to what is meant by saying that a fi
rm gets larger or smaller. A firm becomes larger as additional transactions (which c
ould be exchange transactions co-ordinated through the price mechanism) are organ
ized by the entrepreneur and becomes smaller as he abandons the organization of

such transactions. The question which arises is whether it is possible to study the f
orces which determine the Size of the firm. Why does the entrepreneur not organiz
e one less transaction or one more? It is interesting to note that Professor Knight c
onsiders that:
relation between efficiency and size is one of the most serious problems of th
eory, being, in contrast with the relation for a plant, largely a matter of personality
and historical accident rather than of intelligible generate principles. But the questi
on is peculiarly vital because the possibility of monopoly gain offers a powerful ince
ntive to continuous and unlimited expansion of the firm, which force must be offset
by some equally powerful one making for decreased efficiency (in the production o
f money income) with growth in size, if even boundary competition is to exist.
Professor Knight would appear to consider that it is impossible to treat scientifically
the determinants of the size of the firm. On the basis of the concept of the firm d
eveloped above, this task will now be attempted.
It was suggested that the introduction of the firm was due primarily to the existenc
e of marketing costs. A pertinent question to ask would appear to be (quite apart f
rom the monopoly considerations raised by Professor Knight), why, if by organizing
one can eliminate certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, are there
any market transactions at all?' Why is not all production carried on by one big fir
m? There would appear to be certain possible explanations.
First, as a firm gets larger, there may be decreasing returns to the entrepreneur fu
nction, that is, the costs of organizing additional transactions within the firm may ri
se. Naturally, a point must be reached where the costs of organizing an extra trans
action within the firm are equal to the costs involved in carrying out the transaction
in the open marker, or, to the costs of organizing by another entrepreneur. Secon
dly, it may be that as the transaction which are organized increase, the entreprene
ur fails to place the factors of production in the use where their value is greatest, t
hat is，fails to make the best use of the factors of production. Again, a point must
be reached where the loss through the waste of resources is equal to the marketin
g costs of the exchange transaction in the open market or to the loss if the transa
ction was organized by another entrepreneur. Finally, the supply price of one or mo
re of the factors of production may rise, because the advantagesof a small
firm are greater than those of a large firm. Of course, the actual point where the
expansion of the firm ceases might be determined by a combination of the factors
mentioned above. The first two reasons given most probably correspond to the eco
nomists' phrase of returns to management”.
The point has been made in the previous paragraph that a firm was tend to expan
d until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to
the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the o
pen market or the costs of organizing in another firm. But if the firm stops its expa
nsion at a point below the costs of marketing in the open market and at a point e

qual to the costs of organizing in another firm, in most cases (excluding the case o
f “， this will imply that there is a market transaction between these t
wo produces, each of whom could organize it at less than the actual marketing cos
ts. How is the paradox to be resolved? If we consider an example the reason for t
his will become clear. Suppose A is buying a product from B and that both A and
B could organize this marketing transaction at less than its present cost. B, we can
assume, is not organizing one process or stage of production, but several. If A the
refore wishes to avoid a market transaction, he will have to take over all the proce
sses of production controlled by B. Unless A takes over all the processes of product
ion, a market transaction will still remain, although It is a different product that is
bought. But we have previously assumed that as each producer expands, he becom
es less efficient; the additional costs of organizing extra transactions Increase. It is
probable that A's cost of organizing the transactions previously organized by B will
be greater than B's cost of doing the same thing. A therefore will take over the wh
ole of B's organization only if his cost of organizing B's work is not greater than B's
cost by an amount equal to the costs of carrying out an exchange transaction on
the open market. But once It becomes economical to have a market transaction, it
also pays to divide production in such a way that the cost of organizing an extra tr
ansaction in each firm is the same.
Up to now it has been assumed that the exchange transactions which take place th
rough the price mechanism are homogeneous. In fact, nothing could be more divers
e than the actual transactions which take place in our modern World. This would se
em to imply that the costs of carrying out exchange transactions through the price
mechanism will vary considerably as will also the costs of organizing these transacti
ons within the firm. It seems therefore possible that quite apart from the question
of diminishing returns the costs of organizing certain transactions within the firm ma
y be greater than the costs of carrying out the exchange transactions in the open
market. This would necessarily imply that there were exchange transactions carried
out through the price mechanism, but would it mean that there would have to be
more than one firm? Clearly not, for all those areas in the economic system where
the direction of resources was not dependent directly on the price mechanism could
be organized within one firm. The factors which were discussed earlier would seem
to be the important ones, though it is difficult to say whether returns
to management” or the rising supply price of factors is likely to be the more Impo
rtant.
Other things being equal, therefore, a firm will tend to be larger:
(a) The less the costs of organizing and the slower these costs rise with an increas
e in the transactions organized .
(b) The less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes and the smaller the increas
e in mistakes with an increase in the transactions organized.

(c) The greater the lowering (or the less the rise) in the supply price of factors of
production to firms of larger Size.
Apart from variations in the supply price of factors of production to firms of differe
nt sizes, it would appear that the costs of organizing and the losses through mistak
es will increase with an increase in the spatial distribution of the transactions organi
zed, in the dissimilarity of the transaction, and in the probability of changes in the
relevant prices. As more transactions are organized by an entrepreneur， it would a
ppear that the transactions Would tend to be either different in kind or in different
places. This furnished an additional reason why e efficiency will tend to decrease as
the firm gets larger. Inventions which tend to bring factors of production nearer to
gether, by lessening spatial distribution, tend to increase the size of the firm. Chang
es like the telephone and the telegraph which tend to reduce the cost of organizing
spatially will tend to increase the size of the firm. All changes which improve man
agerial technique will tend to increase the size of the firm.
It should be noted that the definition of a firm which was given above can be used
to give more precise meanings to the terms and There
is a combination when transactions which were previously organized by two or mor
e entrepreneurs become organized by one. These become integration when it envol
ves the organization of transactions which previously carried out between the entrep
reneurs on the market. A firm can expand in either or both of these two ways. Th
e whole of the “structure of competitive industry” becomes tractable by the ordinary
technique of economical analysis.
Ⅲ
The problem which has been investigated in the previous section has not been entir
ely neglected by economists and it is now necessary to consider why the reasons gi
ven above for the emergence of a firm in a specialized exchange economy are to b
e preferred to the other explanations which have been offered.
It is sometimes said that the reason for the existence of a firm is to be found in t
he division of labor. This is the view of Professor Usher, a view which has been ad
opted and expanded by Mr. Maurice Dobb. The firm becomes result of an incr
easing complexity of the division of labor . . . . The growth of this economic differ
entiation creates the need for some integrating force without which differentiation w
ould collapse into chaos; and it is as the integrating force in a differentiated econo
my that industrial forms are chiefly significant. “The answer to this argument is an
obvious one. Theintegrating force in a differentiated economy” already exists in th
e form of the price mechanism. It is perhaps the main achievement of economic sci
ence that it has shown that there is no reason to suppose that specialization must l
ead to chaos. The reason given by Mr. Maurice Dobb is therefore inadmissible. Wha
t has to be explained is why one integrating force (the entrepreneur) should be sub
stituted for another integrating force (the price mechanism).

The most interesting reasons (and probably the most widely accepted) which have
been given to explain this fact are those to be found in Professor Knight's Risk, Un
certainty and Profit. His views will be examined in some details.
Professor Knight starts with a system in which there is no uncertainty:
as individuals under absolute freedom but without collusion men are suppos
ed to have organized economic life with the primary and secondary division of labor,
the use of capital, etc., developed to the point familiar in present-dayAmerica. The
principal fact which calls for the exercise of the imagination is the internal organiza
tion of the productive groups or establishments. With uncertainty entirely absent, ev
ery individual being in possession of perfect knowledge of the situation, here would
be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of
productive activity. Even marketing transactions in any realistic sense would not be
found. The flow of raw materials and productive services to the consumer would b
e entirely automatic.”
Professor Knight says that we can imagine this adjustment as being result of l
ong process of experimentation worked out by trial-and-error methods alone,while
it is not necessary imagine every worker doing exactly the right thing at the ri
ght time in a sort of ' pre- established harmony' with the work of others. There mig
ht be managers, superintendents, etc., for the purpose of co-ordinating the activities
of individuals,though these managers would be performing a purely routine functi
on, responsibility of any sort.
Professor Knight then continues:
the introduction of uncertainty-the fact of ignorance and the necessity of actin
g upon opinion rather than knowledge-into this Eden-like situation, its character is e
ntirely changed ... With uncertainty present doing things, the actual execution of act
ivity, becomes in a real sense a secondary part of life; the primary problem or func
tion is deciding what to do and how to do it.
This fact of uncertainty brines about the two most important characteristics of social
organization.
the first place, goods are produced for a market, on the basis of entirely imper
sonal prediction of wants, not for the satisfaction of the wants of the producers the
mselves. The producer takes the responsibility of forecasting the consumers' wants.
In the second place, the work of forecasting and at the same time a large part of
the technological direction and control of production are still further concentrated up
on a very narrow class of the producers, and we meet with a new economic functi
onary, the entrepreneur. When uncertainty is present and the task of deciding what
to do and how to do it takes the ascendancy over that of execution the internal o
rganization of the productive groups is no longer a matter of Indifference or a mec
hanical detail Centralization of this deciding and controlling function is imperative, a
process of 'captainlism‟ is inevitable.

The most fundamental change is:
the system under which the confident and venturesome，assume the risk or insur
e the doubtful and timid by guaranteeing to the latter a specified income in return
for an assignment of the actual results. . . . With human nature as we know it , it
would be impracticable or very unusual for one man to guarantee to another a de
finite result of the latter's actions without being given power to direct his work. And
on the other hand the second party would not place himself under the direction of
the first without such a guarantee. . . . The result of this manifold specialization o
f function is the enterprise and wage system of industry. Its existence in the world
is the direct result of the fact of uncertainty.
These quotations give the essence of Professor Knight's theory. The fact of uncertai
nty means that people have to forecast future wants. Therefore, you get a special
class springing up who direct the activities of others to whom they give guaranteed
wages. It acts because good judgment is generally associated with confidence in o
ne's judgment.
Professor Knight would appear to leave himself open to criticism on several grounds.
First of all, as he himself points out, the fact that certain people have better judg
ment or better knowledge does not mean that they can only get an income from it
by themselves actively taking part in production. They can sell advice or knowledg
e. Every business buys the services of a host of advisers. We can imagine a syste
m where all advice or knowledge was bought as required. Again, it is possible to g
et a reward from better knowledge or judgment not by activity taking part in produ
ction but by making contracts with people who are producing. A merchant buying f
or future delivery represents an example of this. But this merely illustrates the Point
that it is quite possible to give a guaranteed reward providing that certain acts are
performed without directing the performance of those acts. Professor Knight says t
hat human nature as we know it, it would be impracticable or very unusual f
or one man to guarantee to another a definite result of the latter's actions without
being given power to direct his is surely incorrect. A large proportion of
jobs are done to contract，that is, the contractor is guaranteed a certain sum provi
ding he performs certain acts. But this does not involve any direction. It does mean,
however, that the system of relative price has been changed and that there will b
e a new arrangement of the factors of production. The fact that Professor Knight m
entions that the party would not place himself under the direction of the fi
rst without such a guaranteeis irrelevant to the problem we are considering. Finall
y, it seems important to notice that even in the case of an economic system where
there is no uncertainty Professor Knight considers that there would be co- ordinator
s, though they would perform only a routine function. He immediately adds that the
y would be responsibility of any sort,which raise the question by whom a
re they paid and why? It seems that nowhere does Professor Knight give a reason
why the price mechanism should be superseded.
Ⅳ

It would seem Important to examine one further point and that is to consider the r
elevance of this discussion to the general question of the of the firm.
It has sometimes been assumed that a firm is limited in size under perfect competit
ion if it‟s cost curve slopes upward， while under imperfect competition, it is limited
in size because it will not pay to produce more than the output at which marginal
cost is equal to marginal revenue. But it is clear that a firm may produce more tha
n one product and, therefore, there appears to be no prima facie reason why this
upward slope of the cost curve in the case of perfect competition or the fact that
marginal cost will not always be below marginal revenue in the case of imperfect c
ompletion should limit the size of the fir m. Mrs. Robinson makes the simplifying as
sumption that only one product is being produced. But it is clearly important to inv
estigate how the number of products produced by a firm is determined，while no th
eory which assumes that only one product is in fact produced can have very great
practical significance.
It might be replied that under perfect competition, since everything that is produced
can be sold at the prevailing price, then there is no need for any other product to
be produced. But this argument ignores the fact that there may be a point where
it is less costly to organize the exchange transactions of a new product than to org
anize further exchange transactions of the old product. This point can be illustrated
in the following way. Imagines, following von Thune， that there is a town, the co
nsuming centre, and that industry are located around this central point in rings. Th
ese conditions are illustrated in the following diagram in which A, B and C represen
ts different industry. Imagine an entrepreneur who starts controlling exchange trans
actions from x. Now as he extends his activities in the same produce (B), the cost
of organizing increase until at some point it becomes equal to that of a dissimilar p
roduct which is nearer. As the firm expands， it will therefore from this point includ
e more than one product (A and C).
This treatment of the problem is obviously incomplete, but it is necessary to show t
hat merely proving that the cost curve turns upwards does not give a limitation to
the size of the firm. So far we have only considered the case of perfect competitio
n; the case of imperfect competition would appear to be obvious.
To determine the size of the firm, we have to consider the marketing cost( that is,
the cost of using price mechanism)， and the costs of organizing of deferent entre
preneurs and then we can determine how many products will be produced by e:ch
firm and how much of each it will produce. It would, therefore, appear that Mr. Sh
ove in his article on Competition” was asking questions which Mrs. Robin
son's cost curve apparatus cannot answer. The factors mentioned above would see
m to be the relevant ones.
Ⅴ
Only one task now remains; and that is, to see whether the concept of a firm whic
h has been developed fits in With that existing in the real World. We can best app

roach the question of what constitute a firm in practice by considering the legal rel
ationship normally called that of and servantor and employee.
The essentials of this relationship have been given as follows:
(A) The servant must be under the duty of rendering personal service to the maste
r or to others on behalf of the master, otherwise the contract is a contract for sale
of goods or the like.
(B) The master must have the right to control the servant's work，either personally
or by another servant or agent. It is this right of control or interference，of being e
ntitled to tell the servant when to work (within the hours of service) and when not
to work, and what work to do and how to do it (within the terms of such Service)
which is the dominant characteristic in this relation and marks off the servant from
an independent contractor, or from one employed merely to give to his employer t
he fruits of his labor. In the latter case, the contractor or performer is not under t
he employer's control in doing the work or effecting the service; he has to shape a
nd manage his work so as to give the result he has contracted to effect.
We thus see that it is the fact of direction which is the essence of the legal conce
pt of and employee,just as it was in the economic concept which was
developed is interesting to note that Professor Batt says further:
which distinguishes an agent from a servant is not the absence or presence
of a fixed wage or the payment only of Commission on business done, but rather t
he freedom with which an agent may carry out his employment.
We can therefore conclude that the definition we have Given is one which approxim
ates closely to the firm as it is considered in the real world. Our definition is, there
fore, realistic. Is it manageable? This ought to be clear. When we are considering h
ow large a firm will be the principle of marginalism works smoothly. The question a
lways is，will it Pay to bring an extra exchange transaction under the organizing aut
hority? At the margin, the costs of organizing within the firm will be equal either to
the costs of organizing in another firm or to the costs involved in leaving the tran
saction to be by the price mechanism. Business men will be constantly
experimenting, controlling more or less, and in this way， equilibrium will be maintai
ned. This give the position of equilibrium for static analysis. But it is clear that the
dynamic factors are also of considerable importance，and an investigation of the eff
ect changes have on the Cost of organizing within the firm and on marketing costs
generally will enable one to explain why firms get larger and smaller. We thus hav
e a theory of moving equilibrium. The above analyzing would also appear to have c
larified the relationship between initiative or enterprise and management. Initiative
means forecasting and operates through the price mechanism by the making of new
contracts.
Management proper merely reacts to price changes， rearranging the factors of prod
uction under its control. That the business man normally combines both functions is
an obvious result of the marketing costs which were discussed above. Finally, this

analysis enables us to state more exactly what is meant by the product
of the entrepreneur. But an elaboration of this point would take us far from our co
mparatively simple task of definition and clarification.