毕业论文外文翻译--上市公司的股权结构与公司治理完善-适用于概要
2016年国庆-五年级数学下册教学计划
原文题目:《上市公司的股权结构与公司治理完善》
作者:Shanthy Rachagan
原文出处 :
Journal of Financial Crime Vol. 17 No. 4, 2010 pp.
430-440
上市公司的股权结构与公司治理完善
公司治理是经常被用来解释一个公司的管理, 审议并追究其责任。 公司治理
已成功地得到了市民的关注,因为这对企业和整个社会的经济健康是非常重要 的。
比较 19971998年亚洲金融危机和最近的全球金融危机, 这可以观察到最近
企业和社会的利益已经得到明显的好转。
企业管治问题迈向更大改善依然依赖于全球资本市场的全球化。 我们普遍
认为,
全球移动通信公司将资金投入, 这是有利于企业管理和促使股东权益最大 化,
同时时公司治理最佳做法。 此外, 公司治理中, 重要的是增强投资者的信心,
特别是在新兴经济体里。这必须通过适当的监测保证,才能将这个过程做到位。
在公司发展中, 治理过应有较高信心, 对未来有所期望, 努力在上市公司的
投资界(PLC 公开自己发展,以确保企业行为适当。重点是更多地自我调节,
而不是制度。
公司治理机制的管理要有监督机构,
以产生更有效的管理, 并提高股东价值
的目的。它也是在提高经济效率的关键因素,涉及一间公司的管理层,董事会,
股东关系的集合,其他利益相关者。
公司治理机制的成功实施,
需要公司以平衡管理的冒险性和商业能力来负责
监测和制定政策的程序,使管理的行动配合股东和社会的利益。
大股东或控股股东对公司业务具有一定控制力和影响对,并有强大的动力,
因为公司的资源使用他们只承担总成本的一小部分。有人说,如果不警惕监督,
大股东很容易利用少数股东财富 (Faccio 和 Lang , 2002 。
曾经有大型集中的股
东通过特别分红中提取私人租金 (DeAngelo 等, 2000
, 而 Claessens 等人 (2000
指出:大股东可以集中征收少数股东财
富通过过度补偿方案及与相关方进行交易
(RPTs 。
本文的重点是在多种所有制结构看, 尤其是控股股东的系统, 其对公司治理
的影响。 本文将继续集中审议股东 PLC 的代理问题结合马来西亚的 PLC
具体情况。
该文件将总结建议解决办法,克服集中股权公开上市公司这些机构的问题。
从最近的研究可以看出, 保护少数股东在发达国家和新兴市场的水平是不同
的,这取决于它是否是分散或集中所有权股份。
Coffee(2001所界定的股权分散和集中的所有权如下:分散的股权制度,强
劲的证券市场, 严格的信息披露标准, 高度透明的市场, 其中公司控股市场构成
了最终的纪律处分机制;
集中股权制度,其特点通过控制块持有人,疲软的证券市场,控股收益高的 个人,
低披露和市场透明度的标准表现出, 只有市场对公司控制权发挥适度的作
用,但大银行有可能扮演代替性的监察角色。
伯利和米恩斯理论中(1932年 ,美国呼吁关注企业的广泛持有率,但这种
资本所有权是分散的小股东之间, 其主要控制权集中在经理手中 (鲍莫尔, 1959;
彭罗斯, 1959;马里斯, 1964 。然而,近年来,一些研究已经开始质疑这个理
论。
Shleifer 和 Vishny
(1986和德姆塞茨(1983显示,即使在美国最大的
公司,依然需要有一个适度集中的股权结构。 Thillainathan
(1999指出,在
发展中国家如马来西亚的经济,股权是也高度集中的。
Claessens
等人在他们的研究(2002年发现,在马来西亚,十大家族控制
占总市值的百分之 25。
Zulkafli 等(2005年发现, 1998年 12月,在布尔
萨马来西亚五大股东持股总额为百分之 58.84,而这已在近期略有下降。进行这
项研究在 2006年和 2007年报告的谭谈(2007年发现,在马来西亚 150强上
市公司的五大股东的平均浓度为百分之 54.85。
如前所述,马来西亚是集
中的股权结构。因此,本文将在集中审议股权。当
有一个大股东持有的股份谁大块,
第三人可以选择做, 才考虑作出的要约, 非控
股股东与该公司的大股东协议。
这将导致第三人之间的非控股股东, 因为控股股
东将出售该公司的控制权交给第三方,
让第三方“利益”的公司或可能会选择谁
不承认代理问题少数股东权(Hannsmann
和卡拉克曼, 2004 。
当第三方作出的要约收购一家公司,
有一个控股股东, 小股东和管理层将无
法实行的决定权,
因为大股东将决定是否出售该公司或没有。 如果在一个公平的
退出战略是要为所有股东提供更多的专门规则, 因为公司将需要法律并不包括这
些事宜, 以及一般公司法律并没有作出大股东强制分享决策权当有与非少数人控
制销售销售。 该法律还没有使其成为控股股东在收购少数股权以同样的速度由第
三方(Hannsmann 和卡拉克曼, 2004, [4]提供强制性的。
在 PLC 的大量涌入, 机构投资者, 基金经理, 保险公司和其他非投资者股票
投资组合管理的储户代表。 关于透明度的建议和股东的权力, 从根本上控制其权
力负责,勤奋,积极地行使这些信托投资依赖。新的规则,以加强对权力的机构
投资者应引入。
更强的企业经营者报酬与业绩之间的联系出现问题,
因为对股东利益的调整
和管理的缺乏。 为了使这些利益更加一致,
有相当一部分企业经营者报酬应与所
创造的价值管理。 此外, 对管理者的奖励,
可能是基于相对业绩, 而不是绝对的。
最后, 我想重申,
良好的公司治理是实现经济稳定和在发达国家和发展中经
济体增长:最重要的一点是,
良好的企业管治是一个实效的援助。 它不存在束缚,
而是利用企业在其目标(阿德里安吉百利实现它。
马来西亚似乎专门对促进良好的公司治理制度和实践的发展。 事实上, 相当
大的进展已经取得的成果。然而,正如所见,即使是在最先进的经济体系,有迹 象表明,
一些市场的发展已超过了公司治理制度和实践的发展。 在一个不断变化 的世界,
已经不是什么新鲜事, 金融决策者, 监事和监管机构一直试图追赶市场 的演变注册。
公司治理制度和做法,应不断开发出跟上市场的变化了。经合组织于
1999年纸(特设工作组的企业管治, 1999年恰当地说,它是这样的:
如果一些国家要获得全球资本市场充分受益,如果他们要吸引长期的资本,
公司治理安排必须是可信的和跨越国界的良好理解。 即使企业不依赖外国资本来
源, 坚持良好的公司治理做法严重将有助于改善国内投资者的信心, 可降低资金
成本,并最终导致更稳定的资金来源。
Enhancing
corporate governance in listed companies with
concentrated shareholdings
Shanthy Rachagan (2010
Originally
Published in Journal of Financial Crime Vol. 17
No. 4, 2010 pp. 430-440
III.
corporate governance concentrated
shareholdings
Corporate governance is
a term often used to explain the way a company
is
managed, scrutinised and held
accountable. Corporate governance has succeeded
in
attracting a good deal of public
interest in the recent past because of its
apparent
importance for the economic
health of corporations and society in general.
This can be
observed from the 19971998
Asian financial crises and the more recent global
financial
crises.
The
movement towards greater scrutiny of corporate
governance issues has also
been developed
worldwide in response to the globalisation of
capital markets. It is widely
believed
that mobile global capital will be invested in
corporations, which are well
managed and
best maximise long-term shareholder interests
while following corporate
governance best
practices. Further, it is important that corporate
governance processes
are revealed so that
investor confidence is enhanced, especially in
emerging economies.
This has to be done
by assurance that appropriate monitoring occurs
and procedures are
in place
The development of increased interest in
corporate governance reflects higher
expectations by the investment community for
greater effort by public-listed companies
(PLCs to develop their own procedures to
ensure appropriate standards of corporate
behaviour. The emphasis seems to be more to
self-regulation rather than legislation..
Corporate governance mechanisms have the
purpose of monitoring the management
of
corporations so as to result in more effective
management and to enhance shareholder
value. It is also said to be a key element in
improving economic efficiency and involves a
set of relationships between a company’s
management, its board, its shareholders, and
other stakeholders
The successful
implementation of corporate governance mechanisms
enables a
corporation to balance the need
for managerial risk-taking and commercial
abilities with
procedures for monitoring
and setting policy so that the actions of
management match
with the interests of
shareholders and the community.
Large
or controlling shareholders generally have
substantial control and influence
over
company matters and have powerful incentives to
use company resources since they
bear only
a fraction of the total cost. It has been
suggested that without vigilant oversight,
large shareholders are prone to exploit
minority shareholders wealth (Faccio and Lang,
2002. It has also been documented that large
concentrated shareholders extract private
rents through special dividends (DeAngelo et
al., 2000, while Claessens et al. (2000 note
that large concentrated shareholders can
expropriate minority shareholders wealth
through excessive compensation
schemes and related party transactions
(RPTs.
The focus of this paper is to
look at diverse ownership structures, especially
the
controlling shareholder system, and
their impact on corporate governance. The paper
will
then go on to deliberate the agency
problems in concentrated shareholder PLCs in
general
and Malaysian PLCs specifically.
The paper will then conclude by suggesting
solutions
to overcome these agency
problems in concentrated shareholding public-
listed
companies.
It can
be seen from recent research that minority
shareholder protection is at
different
levels in developed and emerging markets and
depending on whether it is
dispersed or
concentrated ownership of shares.
Coffee (2001 defined dispersed ownership and
concentrated ownership as follows:
A
dispersed ownership system, characterized by
strong securities markets,rigorous
disclosure standards, and high market
transparency, in which the market for
corporate
control constitutes the ultimate
disciplinary mechanism;and A concentrated
ownership
system, characterized by
controlling block holders, weak securities
markets, high private
benefits of control,
and low disclosure and market transparency
standards, with only a
modest role played
by the market for corporate control, but with a
possibly
substitutionary monitoring role
played by large banks.
In Berle and
Means (1932, called attention to the prevalence of
widely held
corporations in the USA, in
which ownership of capital was dispersed between
small
shareholders, yet control was
concentrated in the hands of managers (Baumol,
1959;
Penrose, 1959; Marris, 1964.
However, in recent years, several studies have
begun to
question this theory. Shleifer
and Vishny (1986 and Demsetz (1983 have shown that
even
in the largest American companies,
there is a modest concentration of ownership.
Thillainathan (1999 says that in developing
economies like Malaysia, ownership is also
heavily concentrated.
Claessens et
al. (2002 in their research found that in
Malaysia, the top ten families
control
about 25 percent of the total market
capitalization. Zulkafli et al. (2005 found
that
total shareholding of the five
largest shareholders in Bursa Malaysia at December
1998
was 58.84 percent, a figure which has
decreased slightly in recent times. The study
conducted in 2006 and reported in 2007 by Tam
and Tan (2007 found the average
concentration of the five largest shareholders
in the top 150
Malaysian-listed
companies is 54.85 percent. As stated earlier,
Malaysia has
concentrated shareholding.
Therefore, the deliberation in this paper will be
on
concentrated shareholding. When there
is a majority shareholder who holds a large
block
of shares, the third party may
choose to make an agreement with that majority
shareholder before considering making an offer
to the non-controlling shareholders. This
would cause agency problems between the third
party and the non-controlling
shareholders
because the controlling shareholders would be
selling control of the
company to the
third party, allowing the third party to “benefit”
from the company or
who may choose not to
recognize the rights of the minority shareholders
(Hannsmann
and Kraakman, 2004. When a
third party makes an offer to acquire a company
that has a
controlling shareholder, the
minority shareholders and the management would not
be able
to practice its decision rights
because the majority shareholder would decide
whether to
sell the company or not. In the
event that a fair exit strategy is to be provided
for all
shareholders, more specialized
rules would be required because company law does
not
encompass these matters, and the
general company law does not make it compulsory
for
the majority shareholders to share the
decision rights when there is a sale of control
with
the non-selling minority. The law
also does not make it mandatory for
controlling
shareholders to buy out
minority shareholdings at the same rate as offered
by the third
party (Hannsmann and
Kraakman, 2004. The large number of PLCs has
institutional
investors, fund managers,
insurance companies, and other discretionary
investors
managing portfolios of shares on
behalf of savers. The proposals on transparency
and the
controlling powers of shareholders
are fundamentally dependent on the
responsible,
diligent, and active
exercise of their powers by these fiduciary
investors. New rules to
strengthen the
powers of institutional investors should be
introduced. Stronger link
between
managerial compensation to performance Problems
arise because of lack of
alignment of the
interests of shareholders and management. To make
these interests more
congruent, a
significant portion of managerial compensation
should be linked to the value
created by
the management. Further, the rewards to the
managers may be based on
relative
performance, rather than absolute performance. In
conclusion, I would like to
restate that
good corporate governance is essential to economic
stability and growth in
developed and
developing economies: The essential point is that
good corporate
governance is an aid to
effectiveness. It is not
there to
shackle enterprise but to harness it in the
achievement of its goals (Adrian
Cadbury.
Malaysia seems dedicated towards promoting the
development of sound
corporate governance
systems and practices. Indeed, considerable
progress already has
been achieved. Yet,
as seen, even in the most advanced economies,
there have been signs
that some
developments in markets have outpaced the
development of corporate
governance
systems and practices. In an ever-changing world,
this is nothing new,
financial policy
makers, supervisors, and regulators are always
trying to catch up with the
evolution of
markets. Malaysia’s corporate governance systems
and practices should be
constantly
developed to keep up with the evolution of
markets. The OECD paper in 1999
(Ad Hoc
Task Force on Corporate Governance, 1999 aptly
stated it this way: If countries
are to
reap the full benefit of the global capital
market, and if they are to attract long-term
“patient” capital, corporate governance
arrangements must be credible and well
understood across borders. Even if
corporations do not rely heavily on foreign
sources of
capital, adherence to good
corporate governance practices will help improve
the
confidence of domestic investors, may
reduce the cost of capital and ultimately
induce
more stable sources of
financing.