HSBC Money Laundering Case
2019美术分数线-同学聚会邀请函
HSBC Money Laundering Case: “Too Big To
Fail” does not mean “Too Big to Jail”
September 24th, 2013 by Kara in Case Studies
The ProblemAlphonse Capone
Some
banking institutions have become so large criminal
prosecutions resulting in
revocation of
banking charters may negatively affect the
national, and perhaps the global,
economy. The
U.S. Attorney General and other prosecutors are
thus left with a moral
dilemma: ensure justice
through prosecution or forego criminal proceedings
to protect the
economy and society at large.
HSBC and Money Laundering
In
December 2012, multinational banking institution
HSBC was penalized a record $$1.92
billion by
the United States for violating laws designed to
prevent money laundering and
other illegal
financial activity. HSBC was under consistent
suspicion and twice given
warnings and orders
to strengthen its anti-money laundering programs
by the U.S. between
2003 and 2010 but failed
to make the proper adjustments. The $$1.92 billion
penalty, issued
under the Bank Secrecy Act,
was handed down after a report and subsequent
investigation
that confirmed the bank had set
up offshore accounts for drug cartels and
suspected
criminals in Jersey. HSBC banking
executives admitted to laundering as much as $$881
billion
dollars.
Players
HSBC North American Holdings, Inc.: parent
company of HSBC Group, one of the world’s
largest banking and financial services groups.
HSBC has more than 6900 offices in over 80
countries.
HSBC Bank USA: federally
chartered subsidiary of HSBC North American
Holdings, Inc.;
headquartered in McLean,
Virginia with its principal offices in New York
City. HSBC Bank
USA is the specific entity
charged with violating the Bank Secrecy Act.
Eric Holder: United States Attorney
General; publicly defended the decision not to
criminally
prosecute HSBC Bank USA executives.
HSBC Bank USA Executives: Specifically
those responsible for the lax monitoring programs
and other negligence that violated the Bank
Secrecy Act.
HSBC Bank USA Employees:
would lose their jobs if HSBC were forced to cease
banking
operations in the United States.
The United States’ (and possibly the global)
economy: As stated by Attorney General Eric
Holder, the national economy will suffer
greatly if HSBC’s U.S. banking charter is revoked.
United States Department of the Treasury:
As one of the regulators of HSBC Bank USA’s
financial affairs the Treasury is tasked with
advising the Department of Justice on the
economic effects of prosecuting HSBC.
Office of the Comptroller: As the regulator of
HSBC Bank USA’s banking charter, the
Comptroller can revoke HSBC Bank USA’s banking
privileges in the U.S. if its executives are
prosecuted and convicted.
Instruments
Bank Secrecy Act (31 USC §5311): enacted
by Congress to require banks and other financial
institutions to create and maintain anti-money
laundering programs and other practices to
prevent terrorist financing and other
financial crimes. In addition to internal programs
and
monitoring, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)
also requires ongoing employee training and due
diligence for foreign correspondent accounts.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement: To avoid
criminal prosecution for violations of the BSA,
HSBC executives agreed to pay a $$1.92 billion
fine and comply with elevated monitoring
standards for a probationary period of five
years.
Events
From 2003-2006, HSBC Bank USA was under
heavy suspicion by United States regulators
and operated under a written agreement to
correct the deficiencies of their operational
practices. HSBC Bank USA specifically agreed
to enhance its anti-money laundering program
to achieve adequate compliance with the Bank
Secrecy Act.
Between 2006 and 2010, HSBC
Bank USA violated several components of the BSA:
Money
laundering risks associated with doing
business with certain Mexican customers were
ignored, compliance issues at HSBC Mexico were
overlooked, and a BSA-adequate anti-
money
laundering program was not implemented. The Court
notes four significant HSBC
Bank USA failures:
failed to obtain and maintain due diligence
on HSBC Group Affiliates.
failed to
adequately monitor over $$200 trillion in wire
transfers between 2006 and
2009 from customers
in nations classified as “standard” or “medium”
risk ($$670 billion in
wire transfers
specifically from HSBC Mexico).
Bank USA
failed to adequately monitor billions of dollars
in U.S. banknote purchases.
Bank USA failed
to provide proper staffing and resources necessary
to maintain an
effective anti-money laundering
program.
As part of the Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, HSBC Bank USA admitted to
gross violations
of the Bank Secrecy Act,
including failure to establish and maintain an
effective anti-money
laundering program,
failure to establish due diligence, and
involvement in the laundering of
over $$881
billion.
The Penalty
The
record-setting fine, comprised of $$1.256 billion
in forfeiture and $$665 million in civil
penalties, allows HSBC to temporarily thwart
criminal prosecution pending a probationary
period of compliance with anti-money
laundering standards. The probationary period
consists of a five-year agreement with the
U.S. DOJ that includes an independent monitor of
HSBC’s internal anti-money laundering
programs, bonus deference by the bank’s top
executives, and retraction of bonuses from
some current and former executives who had
particular involvement in the willful breach
of U.S. regulations.
Public Controversy
In March of 2013, Attorney General
Eric Holder defended the U.S. government’s
decision
not to pursue criminal prosecution of
HSBC by claiming that prosecution of such large
institutions has a negative impact on the
national economy. His statement stirred some
outrage. The notion that the largest
corporations, deemed equal to people under the law
by
the U.S. Supreme Court in the Citizens
United case in 2010, are now afforded freedom from
criminal prosecution as well.
At the
forefront of prosecution advocates is Senator
Elizabeth Warren, who voiced publicly
her
disdain for the decision not to prosecute HSBC for
money laundering. She posed this
question to
the Department of Justice (DOJ): “How many
billions of dollars of drug money
do you have
to launder…before someone will consider shutting
down a bank?” Not one
Treasury or Justice
Department official offered her a direct answer.
One thing is evident:
The Justice Department
seems to hold all the cards in deciding the fate
of HSBC’s ability to
continue operating in the
U.S. The Comptroller cannot revoke its charter
without a criminal
conviction and the role of
the Treasury is simply to advise the DOJ on an
institution’s impact
on the economy.
Regardless of the economic reasons, the decision
not to prosecute
questions the integrity of
the entire justice system. Can we justify
deferring prosecution for
willful criminal
activity in the name of protecting the national
economy? The debate
presents an ethical
dilemma between justice and utilitarianism.
Utilitarian Approach
Utilitarianism,
also known as the “greatest happiness principle”
holds that decisions and
actions are proper as
long as they promote proportional utility, and by
the same accord
improper as they produce an
overall negative utility. A utilitarian view,
then, would
advocate an act if a greater
benefit would be afforded to a larger number of
individuals in
society. This principle
supports the Department of Justice decision not to
prosecute HSBC,
because not prosecuting HSBC
benefits a greater number of individuals in
society through
protecting the economy from
harm, even at the expense of letting criminal
activity go
largely unpunished.
Under
a traditional utilitarian view, then, the Justice
Department’s decision not to criminally
prosecute HSBC officials seems sound, as a
larger portion of society benefits from HSBC
maintaining operations (not to mention the
number of saved jobs) and keeping the
economy
from further suffering in already difficult
financial times. The record-setting
monetary
penalty and the probationary monitoring period are
presumably aimed at
deterring future
wrongdoing by HSBC and other large financial
institutions. However, in
spite of $$1.92
billion being the largest fine imposed on any
banking institution in history, it
does not
reflect an amount that could effectively deter a
financial institution the size of
HSBC.
According to Bankers Almanac, HSBC’s annual
before-taxes profit totals more than
$$23
billion.
The $$1.92 billion fine handed
down by the U.S. represents roughly a month’s
profit.
If HSBC and other large banks are
not effectively deterred from continuing illegal
and
unethical financial practices, at some
point in time the utilitarian outcome of
laundering
money for illegal organizations
becomes adverse to the greatest number of people
in
society.
In fact, a deeper
analysis shows that pursuing criminal prosecution
of HSBC’s executives
likely yields a greater
utilitarian outcome in the long run. While the
immediate effect of
prosecution may adversely
affect a great number of individuals in society by
means of a
blow to the economy and the loss of
jobs, the long term effects of allowing a banking
institution like HSBC to engage in criminal
activity with no risk of criminal prosecution,
jail
time, or even the loss of its banking
license, presents a moral hazard. A $$1.92 billion
fine for
laundering upwards of $$881 billion
hardly seems like incentive to exercise due
diligence in
future practices. In fact, the
outcome of HSBC’s case can actually provide
incentive for other
banks to be more lax with
their anti-money laundering practices.
Among the most alarming effects the non-
prosecution decision produces is the harm done
to the large number of individuals affected by
drug trade. That being the case, both justice
and utility seem best served by criminal
prosecution of HSBC executives.
Justice
Approach: Retribution and Deterrence
Society has always had a keen interest in
providing justice for the wrongdoings of
individuals.
As for the intentional breaking
of U.S. laws and sanctions by HSBC executives,
justice can be
readily sought in the forms of
retribution and deterrence. Retributive justice is
simply
providing adequate punishment to
lawbreakers in accordance with their offenses.
Retribution provides two important results:
disincentive for the offender to recommit the
wrongful act and a general deterrence to the
rest of society who may contemplate acting
wrongfully. While retribution is generally
served as a calculated punishment proportional to
the wrongful act, deterrence is most often
pursued by a punishment that outweighs the
wrongful act, to ensure avoidance of future
wrongdoing in general. Often, these
punishments come in the form of large fines.
The conduct of HSBC’s executives
in knowingly failing to adhere to U.S. sanctions
and
regulations is certainly unjust. In making
the decision to defer prosecution of HSBC Bank
USA executives, the primary consideration of
the United States government was to prevent
harm to an already struggling economy. While
instances may exist when other
consequences
may mitigate an application of justice, the long-
term effects of avoiding
prosecution for the
criminal acts of HSBC are too great. When
government allows big
financial institutions
to go largely unpunished for laundering vast sums
of money for
criminal organizations such as
drug cartels, it is essentially endorsing the
immeasurable
amount of harm associated with
the day-to-day activities of global drug trade.
Justice for
perpetuating such criminal
enterprises cannot be adequately administered by a
mere
financial penalty.
Deontological
Aspect: Prosecutorial Duty
A
deontological approach asserts individuals are
morally obligated to act according to a set
of
principles regardless of outcome. Rational people
have a duty to act ethically, no matter
the
consequences. The criminal justice system of the
United States is based largely on
deontological ideals. Prosecutors have a duty
to carry out justice.
Prosecutors and
Attorneys General, like all government officials,
are elected or appointed
under the promise to
uphold the laws. Prosecutors, by design, are
charged with the
responsibility to fairly and
appropriately pursue punishment for wrongdoers in
society.
While all human beings have the same
general obligation to act morally, prosecutors
take
on a special obligation, or duty, when
taking office. Prosecutors assume an elevated duty
to
make certain decisions as a part of their
role in the justice system. As prosecutors accept
taking on the role of pursuing justice for
illegal behavior, they assume an ethical duty to
do
so fairly and diligently no matter the
offender.
The Attorney General and the
DOJ failed in their prosecutorial duties. They did
not
prosecute HSBC officials because of an
uncertain forecast outcome (economic harm).
Ultimately, they failed to provide justice for
gross wrongdoing. The decision not to
prosecute also prevents other regulators from
punishing HSBC. The Court, in upholding the
financial penalty and the Justice Department’s
decision not to prosecute, stated its need to
give broad prosecutorial discretion to the
Executive Branch in matters like these. Hence, the
Comptroller is unable to completely revoke
HSBC’s U.S. banking privileges without some
form of conviction by the Justice Department.
The Deferred Prosecution Agreement
essentially
lets HSBC off the hook with a $$1.92 billion pass
for laundering more than $$880
billion.
Conclusion
The ethical
analysis above applies theories of justice,
utilitarianism, and deontology to the
Department of Justice decision not to pursue
prosecution of HSBC executives. The analysis
suggests that criminal prosecution is probably
the right move, rather than the deferred
prosecution agreement currently in place. The
reasons are:
$$1.92 billion fine and 5-year
probationary monitoring period is unlikely to
deter future
misconduct.
long-term
consequences of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement
may outweigh its
immediate utility.
DOJ
is not fulfilling its prosecutorial duty to pursue
punishment for those who violate
the law.
While some may believe the Deferred
Prosecution Agreement promotes the best interests
of the United States, its long-term effects
may ultimately pose a greater danger.
BY: SAM STORRS
Works Cited
1. HSBC’s Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, Statement of Facts. Case
1:12-cr-00763-ILG
Document 3-3, December
11, 2012.
Accessed online:
http:documentshsbcdpa-attachment-
2.
31 U.S.C. §5311 (Bank Secrecy Act), Declaration of
Purpose.
Accessed online:
http:odetext315311
3. Mill, John
Stuart. Utilitarianism. Edited by Oskar Piest.
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1957.
4. Stempel,
Jonathan. HSBC Wins OK of Record $$1.92 Billion
Money Laundering Settlement.
Reuters.
Tue. July 2, 2013.
Accessed online:
http:icle20130702us-hsbc-
settlement-
laundering-idUSBRE9611B220130702
5. DeGeorge, Richard T. Business Ethics,
Seventh Edition. Pearson Education, Inc. 2010.
6. Lopez, Linette. Elizabeth Warren
Savaged A Treasury Official During A Hearing On
HSBC’s
International Money Laundering
Scandal. Business Insider. March 7, 2013.
Accessed online: http:zabeth-warren-hsbc-
money-
laundering-2013-3
汇丰洗钱案:
大到不能倒并不意味着 大到不能坐牢
2013年9月24日卡拉在案例研究
这个问题Alphonse Capone
一些银行机构已成为如此大规模的刑事起诉, 从而导致撤销银行章程, 可能对国家,
甚至
全球经济产生不利影响。因此,
美国司法部长和其他检察官面临着一个道义上的两难境
地: 通过起诉或放弃刑事诉讼来确保司法公正,
以保护整个经济和社会。
汇丰及洗黑钱
在 2012年12月,
跨国银行汇丰 (HSBC)
因违反旨在防止洗钱和其他非法金融活动的法
律而被美国罚款19.2亿美元。汇丰银行一直受到怀疑,
两次发出警告, 并下令加强美国
在2003至2010期间的反洗钱计划,
但未能作出适当调整。根据《银行保密法》发布的
19.2亿美元罚款, 是在一份报告
和随后的调查证实了该银行在泽西岛设立了贩毒集团和
嫌疑犯的境外账户后发出的。汇丰银行高管承认,
洗钱高达8810亿美元。
球员
汇丰北美控股,
Inc.:汇丰集团的母公司,
全球最大的银行和金融服务集团之一。汇丰在
80多个国家设有逾6900办事处。
汇丰美国银行: 美国汇丰银行北美控股公司的联邦特许子公司,
Inc.;总部位于弗吉尼亚
州的麦克莱恩,
其主要办事处设在纽约市。汇丰银行美国是被指控违反银行保密法的具
体实体。
埃里克持有人: 美国总检察长;公开辩护, 决定不追究汇丰美国银行高管的刑事责任。
汇丰美国银行高管: 特别是那些违反银行保密法的监管松懈和其他疏忽的人。
汇丰银行美国雇员: 如果汇丰被迫停止在美国的银行业务, 将会失去工作。
美国 (也可能是全球) 经济: 正如总检察长所说, 如果汇丰的美国银行业宪章被撤销,
国家
经济将遭受巨大损失。
美国财政部:
作为汇丰银行美国金融事务的监管者之一, 财政部负责就起诉汇丰银行的
经济影响向司法部提供咨询。
主计长办公室: 作为汇丰银行美国银行章程的监管机构, 如果其高管被起诉并被定罪,
主
计长可以在美国撤销汇丰银行的银行特权。
文书
银行保密法(31 南加州大学§5311):
国会制定要求银行和其他金融机构制定和维持反洗
钱方案和其他做法,
以防止资助恐怖主义和其他金融犯罪。除了内部程序和监测外,
《银行保密法》还要求对外国通讯员帐户进行持续的员工培训和尽职调查。
延迟起诉协议: 为了避免对波塞军的违规行为进行刑事起诉,
汇丰高管同意支付19.2亿
美元罚款, 并在试用期为五年的情况下遵守高水准的监测标准。
事件
从 2003-2006, 美国汇丰银行 (HSBC)
受到美国监管机构的严重怀疑, 并根据一份书面协
议进行操作,
以纠正其操作实践中的缺陷。美国汇丰银行 (HSBC) 特别同意加强反洗钱
计划,
以充分遵守《银行保密法》。
在2006和2010之间, 汇丰银行 (hsbc)
美国违反了波塞军的几个组成部分: 与某些墨西
哥客户做生意的洗钱风险被忽视,
汇丰墨西哥的法规遵从性问题被忽视, 波塞军--
足够的
反没有实施洗钱方案。法院注意到美国汇丰银行 (HSBC) 四大银行倒闭:
1.汇丰银行未能获得并保持汇丰集团子公司的尽职调查。
2.汇丰未能在2006至2009期间, 从被归类为 标准或 中等风险的国家的客户中,
充
分监控逾 1万亿200的电汇交易 (特别是从汇丰 (hsbc)
墨西哥电汇的6700亿美元)。
3.美国汇丰银行 (HSBC)
未能充分监控美国钞票购买的数十亿美元。
4.美国汇丰银行未能提供适当的人员和资源,
以维持有效的反洗钱计划。
作为暂缓起诉协议的一部分,
汇丰银行美国承认严重违反《银行保密法》, 包括未能建
立和维持有效的反洗钱计划,
未能建立尽职调查, 并参与洗钱超过8810亿美元。
的惩罚
这项纪录的罚款, 包括12亿5600万元的充公和6亿6500万元的民事罚款,
使汇丰可在
符合反清洗黑钱标准的试用期前,
暂时阻止刑事检控。试用期包括与美国司法部的五年
协议,
其中包括对汇丰内部反洗钱计划的独立监管, 银行高管的奖金遵从,
以及从一些当
前和那些曾特别卷入蓄意违反美国法规的前高管。
公开争论
在 3月 2013年,
司法部长埃里克维护者辩解了美国政府的决定不追求对汇丰的刑事起
诉, 宣称对这类大型机构的起诉对
国家经济有负面影响。他的声明激起了一些愤慨。美
国最高法院在2010年的公民联合案中被认为与法
律上的人平等的最大的公司, 现在也
被赋予了自由的刑事起诉权。
在起诉的支持者中, 最前线的是参议员伊丽莎白. 沃伦,
她公开表示对不起诉汇丰洗钱的
决定不屑一顾。她向司法部 (司法部) 提出这个问题:
在有人考虑关闭银行之前, 你必须
要清洗多少亿美元的毒品钱？没有一个财政部或司法部官员给她一个
直接的答复。有
一点是显而易见的: 在决定汇丰继续在美国运营的能力时,
司法部似乎持有所有的底牌。
主计长不能在没有刑事定罪的情况下撤销其《宪章》,
而财政部的作用只是就机构对经
济的影响向司法部提供咨询意见。无论经济原因如何,
决定不起诉问题的是整个司法系
统的完整性。我们是否有理由以保护国民经济为名,
推迟起诉故意犯罪活动？这场辩论
提出了正义与功利主义之间的伦理两难。
功利的方法
功利主义, 也被称为 最大的快乐原则认为决定和行动是适当的,
只要他们促进比例效
用, 并通过同样的协议不当, 因为他们产生一个整体的负面效用。因此,
如果社会中有更
多的人能够获得更大的利益,
功利主义的观点就会提倡这种行为。这项原则支持律政司
决定不起诉汇丰银行,
因为不起诉汇丰在社会中通过保护经济免受伤害而使更多的人受
益, 即使是让犯罪活动主要惩罚.
根据传统的功利主义观点, 司法部决定不追究汇丰官员的刑事责任似乎是合理的,
因为
汇丰维持业务的大部分受益于社会 (更不用说保存的工作数量), 并保持经济在已经困难
的财政时期进一步痛苦。创纪录的货币罚款和试用期可能旨在阻止汇丰和其他大型金
融机构今后的不法
行为。然而, 尽管19.2亿美元是历史上对任何银行机构征收的最大
罚金,
但它并没有反映出能够有效遏制汇丰银行规模的金融机构的数额。根据银行家年
鉴,
汇丰年度税前利润总额超过230亿美元。
美国发放的19.2亿美元罚金,
大约相当于一个月的利润。
如果汇丰银行和其他大型银行不能有效地阻止持续的非法和不道德的金融行为, 在某一
时刻,
为非法组织洗钱的功利结果就会对最多的人不利。社会.
事实上,
更深层次的分析表明, 追究汇丰高管的刑事起诉可能会从长远来看产生更大的
功利结果。虽然起诉的直
接后果可能对社会中的许多人造成不利影响, 因为它对经济和
失业的打击,
使汇丰这样的银行机构从事犯罪活动并无风险 c 的长期影响riminal起诉,
坐牢,
甚至吊销银行执照, 都是道德风险。8810亿美元以上的19.2亿美元的洗钱罚款似
乎不像是鼓励
在今后的做法中进行尽职调查。事实上, 汇丰银行 (HSBC)
案的结果实际
上可以激励其他银行对其反洗钱做法更加松懈。
不起诉决定产生的最
令人震惊的影响之一是对受毒品贸易影响的大量个人造成的损害。
在这种情况下,
对汇丰高管的刑事起诉似乎是正义和功利的最佳服务。
司法方法: 报应与威慑
社会一向对为个人的不法行径伸张正义有着浓厚的兴趣。至于有意违反美国法律和汇
丰行政人员
的制裁, 可以随时以报复和威慑的形式寻求正义。报应正义是简单地提供适
当的惩罚根据他们的罪行违
法。报应提供了两个重要的结果: 对犯罪者重新承诺不法行
为的抑制,
以及对可能考虑不当行为的社会其他人的一般威慑。虽然惩罚通常是与不法
行为相称的一种计算性惩罚,
但威慑往往是以超过不法行为的惩罚为目的, 以确保今后
避免一般的不法行为。通常,
这些惩罚以巨额罚金的形式出现。
汇丰的高管明知不遵守美国的制裁和规定,
其行为肯定是不公正的。在决定推迟对汇丰
银行 (HSBC) 美国高管的起诉时,
美国政府的首要考虑是防止对已经陷入困境的经济造
成损害。当其他后果可能减轻司法的适用时,
虽然可能存在一些事例,
但避免对汇丰银
行的犯罪行为进行起诉的长期影响是太大了。当政府允许大型金融机构逍遥法外,
为贩
毒集团等犯罪组织洗钱时,
它基本上赞同与日常活动有关的无法估量的伤害。全球毒品
贸易。为了使这类犯罪企业永久维持下去,
不能仅仅通过财政处罚就能充分管理。
义务方面: 检察职责
义务的方法断言个人在道义上有义务根据一套原则行事,
而不管结果如何。理性的人有
义务在道德上采取行动,
不管后果如何。美国的刑事司法系统主要基于义务的理想。检
察官有责任执行正义。
检察官和检察长和所有政府官员一样,
都是根据维护法律的诺言而当选或任命的。根据
设计,
检察官被指控对社会上的违法者进行公平和适当的惩罚。虽然所有的人都有相同
的道德行为的一般义务,
检察官在就职时承担特殊的义务或义务。检察官承担着将某些
决定作为其在司法系统中作用的一部分的崇
高责任。当检察官接受对非法行为伸张正
义的作用时, 他们承担着道德义务,
无论罪犯如何公平和勤奋地去做。
检察总长和司法部都没有履行他们的起诉职责。由于预测结果不确定 (经济损害),
他们
没有起诉汇丰官员。最终, 他们未能为严重的不法行为伸张正义。不起诉的决定也阻止
了
其他监管机构惩罚汇丰。法院在坚持罚款和司法部决定不起诉时,
表示有必要对行政
部门在这些问题上给予广泛的检察酌处权。因此,
如果没有司法部的某种形式的定罪,
主计长无法完全撤销汇丰的美国银行特权。暂缓起诉协议基本上让
汇丰摆脱了19.2亿
美元以上的洗钱活动, 超过了8800亿美元。
结论
以上的伦理分析将正义、功利主义和论的理论应用于司法部决定,
不追究汇丰高管的起
诉。分析表明, 刑事起诉可能是正确的行动,
而不是目前已有的暂缓起诉协议。原因如
下:
1.罚款19.2亿元及5年的见习期,
不太可能阻吓日后的不当行为。
2.延期起诉协议的长期后果可能超过其直接效用。
3.司法部没有履行其起诉义务, 对触犯法律的人进行惩罚。
尽管一些人可能认为, 暂缓起诉协议促进了美国的最大利益,
但其长期影响可能最终会
带来更大的危险。
由: 山姆斯托斯
引用的作品
1.
汇丰的暂缓起诉协议, 陈述事实。案例 1:12-cr-00763-ILG 文件 3-3,
2012年12月11日。
在线访问: http:documentshsbcdpa-
attachment-pdf
2. 31 南加州§5311 (银行保密法),
目的声明。
联机访问: http:odetext315311
3. 磨房, 约翰斯图尔特。功利主义。由奥斯卡Piest编辑。学徒大厅, Inc.
1957。
4. 坦,
乔纳森。汇丰在创纪录的19.2亿美元洗钱结算中获胜.路透社.星期二.2013年7
月2日。
在线访问: http:icle20130702us-hsbc-
settlement-laundering-
idUSBRE9611B220130702
5. DeGeorge, 理查德 T.商业道德, 第七版。皮尔逊教育, Inc.
2010。
6. 洛佩兹, Linette。在一次关于汇丰国际洗钱丑闻的听证会上,
伊丽莎白. 沃伦对财政部
官员进行了猛烈抨击。商业内幕。2013年3月7日。
在线访问: http:zabeth-warren-hsbc-money-
laundering-
2013-3