产权分析范式-阿尔钦
核心资本充足率-英语学习计划作文
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The Property Right Paradigm
Armen
A. Aichian, Harold Demsetz
The Journal of
Economic History
Volume 33, Issue 1
The
Tasks of Economic History
March 1973, 16-27.
Index
Introduction
The Structure
of Rights
The Social Consequences of the
Structure of Rights
The Development of
Property Rights Structures
Bibliographical
Appendix
Introduction
ECONOMICS
textbooks invariably describe the important
economic choices that all
societies must make
by the following three questions: What goods are
to be produced? How
are these goods to be
produced? Who is to get what is produced? This
way of stating social
choice problems is
misleading. Economic organizations necessarily do
resolve these issues in
one fashion or
another, but even the most centralized societies
do not and cannot specify the
answer to these
questions in advance and in detail. It is more
useful and nearer to the truth to
view a
social system as relying on techniques, rules, or
customs to resolve conflicts that arise in
the
use of scarce resources rather than imagining that
societies specify the particular uses to which
resources will be put.
Since the same
resource cannot simultaneously be used to satisfy
competing demands,
conflicts of interest will
be resolved one way or the other. The
arrangements for doing this run
the full gamut
of human experience and include war, strikes,
elections, religious authority, legal
arbitration, exchange, and gambling. Each
society employs a mix of such devices, and the
difference between social organizations
consists largely in the emphasis they give to
particular
methods for resolving the social
problems associated with resource scarcity.
Capitalism relies heavily on markets and
private property rights to resolve conflicts over
the
use of scarce resources. These
fundamental characteristics of an idealized
capitalistic system
have been taken for
granted by most mainstream economists even though
the discipline of
economics developed
contemporaneously with Western style capitalism.
It is unfortunate that
the study of the
underpinnings of capitalism has been left by
default to its critics on the left.
But recent
years have witnessed increasing attention to the
subject of property rights and to
the
beginning of a somewhat different approach to the
analysis of social problems that find their
source in
Grateful acknowledgement for aid
is made to the E. Lilly Endowment Inc. grant to
the
Economics Department, U.C.L.A. for
research on behavioral effects of different
property rights.
16
scarcity. Three
questions are suggested by this growing
literature: (1) What is the structure
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of property rights in a society at some point
of time? (2) What consequences for social
interaction
flow from a particular structure
of property rights? and, (3) How has this property
right structure
come into being? Economic
historians can contribute very much to overcoming
our ignorance
about the answers to these
questions, and our purpose here is to facilitate
historical research on
these problems by
clarifying somewhat the content of these
questions.
THE STRUCTURE OF RIGHTS
In
common speech, we frequently speak of someone
owning this land, that house, or these
bonds.
This conversational style undoubtedly is
economical from the viewpoint of quick
communication, but it masks the variety and
complexity of the ownership relationship. What is
owned are rights to use resources, including
one‟s body and mind, and these rights are always
circumscribed, often by the prohibition of
certain actions. To “own land” usually means to
have
the right to till (or not to till) the
soil, to mine the soil, to offer those rights for
sale, etc., but not to
have the right to throw
soil at a passerby, to use it to change the course
of a stream, or to force
someone to buy it.
What are owned are socially recognized rights of
action.
The strength with which rights are
owned can be defined by the extent to which an
owner‟s
decision about how a resource will be
used actually determines the use. If the
probability is “1”
that an owner‟s choice of
how a particular right should be exercised
actually dominates the
decision process that
governs actual use, then that owner can be said to
own absolutely the
particular right under
consideration. For example, a person may have an
absolute right to pick
apples off a tree, but
not to prune the tree.
The domain of
demarcated uses of a resource can be partitioned
among several people.
More than one party can
claim some ownership interest in the same
resource. One party may
own the right to till
the land, while another, perhaps the state, may
own an easement to traverse or
otherwise use
the land for specific purposes. It is not the
resource itself which is owned; it is a
bundle, or a portion, of rights to use a
resource that is owned. In its original meaning,
property
referred solely to a right, title, or
interest, and resources could not be identified as
property any
more than they could be
identified as right, title, or interest.
17
Distinct from the partitioning of the domain
of uses to which a resource may be put is the
decision process that may be relied upon to
determine that use: The exercise of a particular
right
may depend on a decision process in
which many individuals share, such as in the use
of majority
voting. The right to vote may be
exercised individually, but it is the pattern of
votes by many
individuals that determines the
way in which a right to use a resource will be
exercised.
There are two important questions
that can be asked about the structure of property
rights in a
society. The first asks which
property rights exist. There may exist a
particular right of use in a
society that did
not exist earlier or that does not exist in other
societies. For example, early in the
history
of radio, users of frequencies did not own the
right to prevent members of the community
from
broadcasting on these same radio frequencies. Any
person who wished to could broadcast
on any
frequency, and that is still true today for
certain bands of radio frequencies. The right to
offer heroin for sale on the open market does
not exist in the United States although it may in
other countries. The right to advocate
particular political doctrines exists in greater
degree in the
United States than in Russia.
(It should be noted that the right to advocate is
a right to use
resources, for no advocacy
could take place without the use of a place and
other facilities.)
The second question calls
attention to the fact that the identity of right
owners may vary.
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Perhaps the most
important ownership distinction is between state
(public) ownership and private
ownership. An
easement right may be owned by the state or by an
individual. The right to
deliver first class
mail is owned by the state, whereas the right to
board troops without permission
is not.
Needless to say, the classification of social
systems according to the degree of
centralization of control is closely related
to the degree to which property rights are owned
exclusively by the state.
There is some
ambiguity in the notion of state or private
ownership of a resource, because the
bundle of
property rights associated with a resource is
divisible. There can and does exist much
confusion about whether a resource or
“property” is state or privately owned. Some
rights to
some uses of the resource may be
state owned and others privately owned. While it
is true that
the degree of private control is
increased when additional rights of use become
privately owned, it
is somewhat arbitrary to
pass judgment on when the conversion to private
control can be said to
change the ownership of
the
18
bundle of rights from public to
private. The classification of owners can be
carried beyond
the important state and private
dichotomy. Corporate, school, and church owners
of property are
also of interest. The
structure of rights can have important
consequences for the allocation of
resources,
some of which we now illustrate.
THE SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THE STRUCTURE OF RIGHTS
The
significance of which rights exist can be
appreciated by contrasting situations in which
there is and is not a right to exclude. We
shall use the phrase “communal rights” to describe
a
bundle of rights which includes the right to
use a scarce resource but fails to include the
right of an
“absentee owner” to exclude others
from using the resource. Operationally this means
that the
use of a scarce resource is
determined on a first-come, first-serve basis and
persists for as long as a
person continues to
use the resource. The use of a city sidewalk or a
“public” road is communal,
and the rights to
till or hunt the land have been subjected to this
form of ownership frequently.
Often communal
ownership is technically associated with state
ownership, as in the case of public
parks,
wherein the state technically has the capability
of excluding persons from using its property.
If this right is exercised by the state
frequently, as it is on military reservations,
then the property
right is more properly
identified as state owned, but if the right to
exclude is seldom exercised by
the state, as
in public parks or thoroughfares, then as a
practical matter the users of the resource
will treat it as communal. Communal rights
mean that the working arrangement for the use of a
resource is such that neither the state nor
individual citizens can exclude others from using
the
resource except by prior and continuing
use of the resource. The first driver to enter
the public
road has a right of use that
continues for as long as he uses the road. A
second driver can follow
the first but cannot
displace or exclude him.
The difficulty with a
communal right is that it is not conducive to the
accurate measurement
of the cost that will be
associated with any person‟s use of the resource.
Persons who own
communal rights will tend to
exercise these rights in ways that ignore the full
consequences of
their actions. For example,
one of the costs of hunting animals, if they are
not superabundant, is
the resulting depletion
in the subsequent stock of animals. This cost
will be taken into account
only if it is in
someone‟s interest to do so. This interest is
provided
19
if someone can lay claim to or
benefit from the increase in the stock of animals
that results
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from a curtailment in
his hunting activities. Under a communal right
system anyone who refrains
from hunting does
so not to his benefit but to the benefit of others
who will continue to exercise
their communal
right to hunt. Each person, therefore, will tend
to hunt the land too intensively
and deplete
the stock of animals too rapidly.
Often the
exercise of communal rights forces persons to
behave in ways that are thought to be
immoral.
In 1970, the newspapers carried stories of the
barbaric and cruel annual slaughter of
baby
seals on the ice floes off Prince Edward Island in
the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The Canadian
government permitted no more than 50,000
animals to be taken, so hunters worked with speed
to
make their kills before the legal maximum
was reached. They swarmed over ice floes and
crushed the babies‟ skulls with heavy clubs.
Government offices received many protests that the
seals were inhumanely clubbed (by humans) and
often skinned alive. The minister of fisheries
warned the hunters of the strong pressure he
was under to ban the hunt and that he would do so
unless the killing methods were humane in
1970. Clearly, it is not the hunters who are to
blame
but the regulations governing seal
hunting that impose a communal right to hunt on
hunters until
50,000 baby seals have been
taken. The first 50,000 animals are offered free
on a first-come,
first-serve basis, a
rationing system that is bound to encourage rapid
hunting techniques and to
make a condition for
success the degree to which the hunter can be
ruthless.
The problems posed by communal
rights are abundantly clear when we analyze the
causes of
pollution. Since the state has
invited its citizens to treat lakes and waterways
as if they are free
goods, that is, since the
state generally has failed to exclude persons from
exercising communal
rights in the use of these
resources, many of these resources have been
overutilized to the point
where pollution
poses a severe threat to the productivity of the
resource.
An attenuation in the bundle of
rights that disallows exchange at market clearing
prices will
also alter the allocation of
resources. The interests pursued by men are both
varied and many.
If a price ceiling or price
floor prevents owners from catering to their
desires for greater wealth,
they will yield
more to the pursuit of other goals. For example,
effective rent control encourages
owners of
apartments to lease them to childless adults who
are less likely to damage their
20
living
quarters. Effective rent control also prompts
landlords to lease their apartments to
persons
possessing personal characteristics that landlords
favor. In a Chicago newspaper, the
percentage
of apartment for rent advertisements specifying
that the apartment was for rent only on
a
“restricted” basis or only if the renter purchased
the furniture rose from a pro-war low of 10
percent to a wartime high of 90 percent during
the period of World War II when rent control
effectively created queues of prospective
renters. Attenuations in the right to offer for
sale or
purchase at market clearing prices can
be expected to give greater advantages to those
who
possess more appealing racial or personal
attributes.
The reallocation of resources
associated with the absence of a right to exclude
and the
inability to exchange at market
clearing prices is attributable to the increase in
the cost of
transacting brought about by these
modifications in the property right bundle. A
price fixing law
raises the cost of allocating
resources vis-á-vis the price mechanism and,
therefore, forces
transactors to place greater
reliance on non-price allocation methods. This is
obvious; but not
equally obvious is the role
played by transaction cost when the right to
exclude is absent.
Consider the problem of
congestion during certain hours in the use of
freeways. No one
exercises the right to
exclude drivers from using freeways during these
hours. The right to drive
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on
freeways is a communal right. But drivers who
desire less congestion are not legally
prohibited from paying others to use
alternative routes during these hours. This right
system,
however, encourages drivers to let
someone else pay persons to use alternative
routes, since those
who do not pay cannot be
excluded from the use of the freeway under a
communal right system.
The communal right
system raises transaction cost by creating a free
rider problem. Moreover,
even if some
temporary reduction in congestion is purchased,
there may be many persons not now
using the
freeway who are attracted to it by the temporary
reduction in congestion. The supply
of
freeway space is very likely to create a demand
for its use under the communal right system
because these new users cannot be excluded.
They also must be paid to return to alternative
routes, and this burdens the allocation system
with additional costly transactions. A right
system
that includes the right to exclude
nonpayers, such as is possible with tollroads,
eliminates both
these sources of high
transaction cost. Persons not now using the road
can use it only if they
value the route
21
enough to pay the toll, and the owner of the
toll road is not handicapped by the psychology of
a freeloader.
The social consequences of
the identity of right owners also can have
allocative effects. At
the more obvious
level, government and private owners,
respectively, will respond in greater
degree
to political and market incentives, and this can
be expected to yield differing resource uses.
But the effect on resource allocation of
altering the identity of owners, all of whom are
private
owners, is not so obvious. As a first
approximation, each and all private owners can be
expected
to respond to market incentives in
the same way so that the particular identity of
owners will not
alter the uses to which
resources are put. All private owners have strong
incentives to use their
property rights in the
most valuable way. Under certain conditions, this
approximation can be
expected to be very good.
The most important of these conditions is that the
cost of transactions
be negligible; in this
case, it will be easy for those who can put
resources to their most valuable
uses to
contact and negotiate with those persons presently
owning the rights to these resources.
If the
cost of transactions is not negligible, then an
alteration in the identity of right owners can
have allocative effects because negotiations
toward a unique utilization of resources may be
inhibited by positive transaction costs.
The most important effect of alterations in
institutional arrangements may well be the impact
of such reorganizations on the cost of
transacting. The enclosure movement, for example,
may
have significantly reduced the cost of
carrying on transactions among those possessing
rights of
use, and this may have eased the
task of putting resources to their most productive
uses. Perhaps
some new insights about the
consequences of the enclosure movement can be
obtained if the
researcher focuses his
attention on the cost of transacting.
THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHT STRUCTURES
Under
a communal right system each person has the
private right to the use of a resource
once it
is captured or taken, but only a communal right to
the same resource before it is taken.
This
incongruity between ownership opportunities
prompts men to convert their rights into the
most valuable form; they will convert the
resources owned under communal arrangements into
resources owned privately, that is, they will
hunt in order to establish private rights over
22
the animals. The problem can be
resolved either by converting the communal right
to a
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private right, in which case
there will be no overriding need to hunt the
animals in order to
establish a private claim,
or the incentive to convert communal rights to
private rights can be
restrained through
regulation.
There is a basic instability in an
arrangement which provides for communal rights
over a
resource when that resource takes one
form and private rights when it takes another
form. The
private right form will displace
the communal right form. In itself this has
important
consequences only if the conversion
of communal ownership into private ownership is
costly.
Thus, if unbranded animals are held
to be communal property while branded animals are
private,
there will be a rush to place brands
on the animals. This would not be very costly,
especially
since branding would be desirable
for identification purposes anyway. There would
be no need
to kill the animals in order to
establish private rights, so that these animals
can be husbanded
appropriately once the cost
of branding is incurred. But a conversion process
that requires that
the animals be killed in
order to establish private rights must incur the
larger social cost of
depleting the stock of
animals.
If the social adjustment to the
incongruity between communal and private rights is
resolved
in favor of eliminating the private
right, then the immediate problem is replaced by
another - the
problem of providing incentives
to work. Thus, if we suppose that the communal
right to hunt is
supplemented by the
stipulation that killed animals belong to the
community, in which all citizens
can share
according to custom, and do not belong exclusively
to the hunter, then the incentive to
hunt will
be diminished. This may cure the overhunting
problem by creating an underhunting
problem in
which the able-bodied wait for others to do the
hunting, the results of which will be
shared
by all. In order to reduce the severity of the
shirking problem that is thereby created, it is
necessary for societies which fail to
establish private rights to move ever closer to a
social
organization in which the behavior of
individuals is directly regulated by the state or
indirectly
influenced by cultural
indoctrination. The option to hunt or not to hunt
cannot be left with the
individual who, unable
to claim the fruit of his effort, will tend to
shirk. Instead, the state will
find it
increasingly necessary to order the hunt, to
insist on participation in it, and to regulate
more
closely the sharing of the kill. Or,
possibly, the community can invest in cultural
23
indoctrination that leads to an
increase in the willingness to hunt. This is in
fact the course
that events have taken among
many primitive peoples. The animals they hunt are
“free” to all on
a first-come, first-serve
basis, but the kill must be shared according to
detailed ritual procedures,
and the question
of participating in the hunt is not left open to
individuals. The attempt to
resolve scarcity-
created problems by reducing the scope of private
rights must inevitably result in
a more
centrally regulated or indoctrinated society. One
need not go so far afield to find this
process
at work. Our public schools are offered on a
“free” right to use basis. As good schools
attract increasing numbers of students, the
community either must expand its resource
commitment to public schools, in order to
offset what it views as overutilization, or it
must
somehow regulate the flow of newcomers.
Zoning restrictions and building codes frequently
have been used to restrict the rate of
immigration into such communities.
If private
rights can be policed easily, it is practicable to
resolve the problem by converting
communal
rights into private rights. 1 Contrary to some
popular notions, it can be seen that
private
rights can be socially useful precisely because
they encourage persons to take account of
social costs. The identification of private
rights with anti-social behavior is a doctrine as
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mischievous as it is popular.
The instability inherent in a communal right
system will become especially acute when
changes in technology or demands make the
resource which is owned communally more valuable
than it has been. Such changes are likely to
bring with them harmful and beneficial effects
which
can be measured and taken account of
only by incurring large transaction costs under
the existing
property right structure. In
such situations, we expect to observe
modifications in the structure of
rights which
allow persons to respond more fully and
appropriately to these new costs and benefits.
The coming of the fur trade to the New
Continent had two consequences. The value of furs
to
the Indians increased and so did the scale
of hunting activities. Before the coming of the
fur
trade, the Indians could tolerate a social
arrangement that allowed free hunting, for the
scale of
hunting activities must have been too
small to seriously deplete the stock
1.
Alternatively, of course, the communal right can
be converted to a state right in which the
state seeks to exclude, perhaps by adopting a
price mechanism, the issue raised by state vs.
private
ownership is not so much one of what
can be done but one of what will be done by state
owners.
24
of animals. But after the fur
trade, it became necessary to economize on the
scale of
hunting. The control system adopted
by the Indians in the Northeastern part of the
continent was
to substitute private rights in
land for free access to hunting lands. By owning
the right to
exclude others from their land,
Indian families were provided with an incentive to
inventory their
animals. Under a free access
arrangement, such inventories would have been
depleted by other
hunters. With private
rights to hunt the land these inventories could be
maintained at levels more
consistent with the
growing market for furs.
Similarly, Professor
North notes that twelfth-century England
experienced a relative rise in
the value of
land which led to efforts to convert the existing
right structure into one that allowed
for
exclusive ownership and transferability. 2 During
the thirteenth century, England
experienced
the development of an extensive body of land law,
the initiations of enclosure, and,
finally,
the right to alienate land, and there were similar
experiences on the Continent.
The relaying of
radio signals between nations in Europe provides
an interesting example of
the breadth of the
property right adjustment that is likely to follow
from an economically
significant technological
development. The telephone company in Holland
decided in 1926 that
it would use its
facilities to relay radio programs received from
outside Holland to subscribers in
Holland in
return for the payment of subscription fees.
However, many of the programs
originating from
such countries as England, France, and Germany
were owned under copyright,
and the copyright
owners were not compensated by the Holland
telephone company. The use of
a resource that
automatically became available to one country once
it was produced in another
posed unusual legal
problems that led to heated controversy and to the
Berne Convention in 1928.
That conference
gave to copyright owners the sole right to
authorize any communication to the
citizens of
signatory countries, whether over wires or not, of
the radio transmission of the
copyright
material. And by 1938, in the United States, the
Federal Radio Commission appeared
to regard
the unauthorized relay of broadcast signals as
illegal.
2. D. North and R. Thomas, “The Rise
and Fall of the Manorial System: A Theoretical
Model,” Journal of Economic History, XXXI
(December 1971), pp. 777-803
25
We have
merely touched on a few cases of evolving
structures of property rights to which
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some contemporary thought has been given.
There exist very many property right phenomena
that could benefit from thoughtful attention.
Consider the problem of the capital structure of
corporations. The well-known Modigliani-
Miller theorem that the value of an enterprise is
independent of its capital structure is a
special application of the assumption that the
cost of
transacting is zero. Titles of
various kinds are assigned to parts of an
enterprise‟s wealth and the
value of these
titles are no more nor less than the present value
of the enterprise‟s wealth potential,
at least
so long as entitlements are well defined,
partitionable, and transferable at zero cost.
Further, they will be revised and exchanged in
ways that maximize the utility of their owner
subject only to the constraint imposed by the
wealth potential of the enterprise.
But, in
fact, these bundles of rights are not costlessly
transferable or revisable, so that a
question
remains as to what bundles of rights are most
appropriate for an enterprise to issue
intially. Bonds, common stocks, preferreds,
convertibles, warrants? Given the cost of
transacting and of revising these bundles of
rights, are there any factors that would explain
the
initial mix? We conjecture that
differences in beliefs by investors about the
potential
performance of the enterprise can
account for differences in the initial mix. An
enterprise that
desires to maximize the sum it
raises from the sale of ownership claims would
find it desirable to
offer different bundles
of rights; a warrant, for example, to optimistic
investors and a bond to
pessimistic investors,
given that markets do not function costlessly. If
the market could produce
these different
bundles costlessly, there would be no need for the
firm to be concerned with
different financial
instruments. For, then, financial intermediaries
could supplement and convert
any financial
instrument issued by the firm into the mix of
financial instruments preferred by
optimistic
and pessimistic investors who hold different
expectations about the firm‟s prospects.
Although articles dealing with property rights
and transaction costs are accumulating at a
rapid pace, they tend to be primarily of the
“speculative theory” variety. Only a handful of
empirical studies have been concluded, a few
of which are concerned with phenomena old enough
to be historical. But economic historians
have much
26
more to contribute, and we
hope that we have made some of you curious enough
to examine
the partial bibliography appended
to this paper.
ARMEN A. ALCHIAN AND
HAROLD DEMSETZ,
University of California, Los
Angeles
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX
1.
A. A. Aichian, “Unemployment and the Cost of
Information,” Western Economic Journal, VII
(June 1969), pp. 109-128.
2.
----------------, “Some Economics of Property
Rights,” Ii Politico, XXX (1965), pp. 816-829.
3. A. Aichian and H. Demsetz, “Production,
Information Cost, and Economic Organization,”
American Economic Review, LXII (December
1972).
4. A. Bottomley, “The Effect of the
Common Ownership of Land Upon Resources Allocation
in
Tripolitania,” Land Economics, (February
1963), pp. 91-95.
5. K. Brunner and A.
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6. S.
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Univ. of Chicago, 1969).
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济学版块，文章版权归作者所有。仅供学术交流，勿用于商业用途。
7. R. H.
Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Reprinted in AEA
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Boulding, Eds., Irwin, 1952, pp. 331-351.
8. --------------, “The Problem of Social
Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, III (October
1960),
pp. 1-40.
9. T. D. Crocker,
“Extenalities, Property Rights, and Transaction
Costs,” Journal of Law and
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10. H. Demsetz,
“Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” AEA Papers
and Proceedings, May 1967,
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11. --------------, „When Does the Rule of
Liability Matter?,” Journal of Legal Studies, I
(January
1972), pp. 13-28.
12.
--------------, “The Private Production of Public
Goods,” Journal of Law and Economics, XIII
(October 1970), pp. 293-306.
13.
--------------, “The Cost of Transacting,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXII (February
1968), pp. 33-53.
14. A. S. Devany, R. D.
Eckert, C. J. Meyers, D. J. O‟Hara, and R. C.
Scott, “A Property System
for Market
Allocation of Electro-Magnetic Spectrum: A Legal-
Economic-Engineering Study,”
Stanford Law
Review, XXX (June 1969), pp. 1499-1561.
15. E.
Furubotn and S. Pejovich, „Property Rights and the
Behavior of the Firm in a Socialist
State,”
Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, XXX (Winter
1970), pp. 431-54.
16. S. MacCauley, “Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study,” American
Sociological Review, XXVIII
(February 1963), pp. 55-67.
17. R. N. McKean,
“Products Liability: Implications of Some Changing
Property Rights,”
Quarterly Journal of
Economics, LXXXII (November 1970), pp. 611-626.
18. D. North and R. Thomas, “The Rise and Fall
of the Manorial System: A Theoretical Model,”
Journal of Economic History, XXXI (December
1971), pp. 777-803.
19. S. Pejovich,
“Liberman‟s Reforms and Property Rights in the
Soviet Union,” Journal of Law
and Economics,
XII (September 1969), pp. 193-200.
20.
-------------, “The Firm, Monetary Policy and
Property Rights in a Planned Economy,” Western
Economic Journal, VII (September 1969), pp.
193-200.
21. S. Rottenberg, „Property in
Work,” Industrial Labor Relations Review, II
(April, 1962), pp.
402-05.
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